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Public Pension Reform and the 
Contract Clause:   A Constitutional 
Protection for Rhode Island’s 
Sacrificial Economic Lamb 
William C. Burnham* 
Like as the waves make towards the pebbled shore, 
So do our minutes hasten to their end, 
Each changing place with that which goes before, 
In sequent toil all forwards do contend. 
Nativity, once in the main of light, 
Crawls to maturity, wherewith being crowned, 
Crooked eclipses ‘gainst his glory fight, 
And time that gave doth now his gift confound. 
Time doth transfix the flourish set on youth 
And delves the parallels in beauty’s brow; 
Feeds on the rarities of nature’s truth, 
And nothing stands but for his scythe to mow. 
  And yet to times in hope my verse shall stand, 
 
* J.D. Candidate, Roger Williams University School of Law, 2016; B.A., 
University of Delaware, 2012.  For my father, Dr. Peter F. Burnham, who 
taught me that while walking the path of a dedicated public servant is 
remarkably treacherous, it is also uniquely fulfilling.  Thank you to Victoria 
Burnham, David Burnham, and Mary Dzidual for their continued love and 
support.  Thank you to the entire Board and Staff of the Roger Williams 
University Law Review, particularly Matthew Provencher for his guidance 
and patience.  
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  Praising thy worth, despite his cruel hand.1 
 -William Shakespeare 
“Pacta sunct servada”—agreements must be kept—
encompasses a familiar concept most of us are taught at 
childhood, but also pervades bedrock principles of civil law.  As 
Americans, one could confidently say the importance of equity, 
fairness, and obligation is woven into the very fabric of our society.  
These fundamental concepts are indeed expressed by the most 
sacred document in American society—the United States 
Constitution.  The federal “Contract Clause” contained in Article 
One, Section Ten of the United States Constitution declares that 
“[n]o State shall . . . pass any . . . Law impairing the Obligation of 
Contracts.”2  Individual states likewise adopted the same or 
similar provisions in their respective constitutions to extend this 
safeguard against legislative interference with contracts on both 
the federal and state levels.3  To what degree is this seemingly 
clear prohibition enforced?  Can a state legally impair contractual 
obligations, even when it is a party to a contract and owes 
significant obligations itself?  The Contract Clause serves as a 
necessary check to ensure that state legislatures functionally 
comply with core principles of fairness and obligation. 
This Comment will explore the Contract Clause as it relates 
to the Rhode Island Retirement Security Act (“RIRSA”).4  RIRSA 
is a landmark piece of state legislation, intended to overhaul the 
ailing and grossly underfunded public pension system in the state 
of Rhode Island.  It consists of three primary legislative actions: 
(1) it changes state employee public pension plans from defined 
benefit plans to “hybrid” defined contribution plans; (2) it 
indefinitely suspends and permanently reduces cost-of-living 
adjustments (“COLAs”); and (3) increases the retirement age.  
These alterations to Rhode Island’s public pension system come at 
the expense of a significant negative impact on current and retired 
 
 1.  William Shakespeare, Sonnet 60, in SHAKESPEARE’S SONNETS 69, 69 
(Waiheke Island: The Floating Press 2009).  
 2.  U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1.  
 3.  See, e.g., R.I. CONST. art. 1, § 12  (“No . . . law impairing the 
obligation of contracts, shall be passed.”). 
 4.  See generally 2011 R.I. Pub. Laws 408.  For the text of the relevant 
bills establishing this legislation, see generally H.B. 6319, 2011 Gen. 
Assemb., Reg. Sess. (R.I. 2011); S.B. 1111, 2011 S., Reg. Sess. (R.I. 2011). 
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state employees.  RIRSA infringes on a wide variety of contractual 
rights.  Perhaps even more importantly, the sweeping breadth and 
long reformatory arm of RIRSA represents a high-water mark for 
state public pension reform legislation nationwide.5  If RIRSA can 
withstand constitutional challenges, many other states will 
implement elements of RIRSA in some capacity to attempt to 
alleviate the burdensome debt of their own underfunded pension 
systems.  The potential impact of this legislation cannot not be 
overstated.  RIRSA will have a tremendous impact in Rhode 
Island and is likely to reverberate throughout the country in the 
coming years.6 
Section I of this Comment details the general background 
facts surrounding the passage of RIRSA, with subsections 
dedicated to the notable substantive changes prescribed by the 
Act.7  Section II will describe the analytic formula implemented by 
the Supreme Court of the United States and later adopted by 
Rhode Island courts for the purposes of evaluating a Contract 
Clause challenge.  Subsections will further describe each prong of 
that test and the nuances and considerations behind each prong of 
the inquiry.8  Section III begins by briefly surveying the challenge 
 
 5.  See John J. Chung, Twenty Years of Impact: The Role of Roger 
Williams University School of Law’s Alumni in Rhode Island Legal History, 
19 ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. REV.  679, 700–02 (2014). 
 6.  See Stuart Buck, The Legal Ramifications of Public Pension Reform, 
17 TEX. REV. L. & POL. 25, 27–28, 31–32, 71–75, 77–80, 87–90 (2012) (using 
RIRSA as part of a multi-state case study of pension reform legislation and 
acknowledging elements of RIRSA as a potentially viable model for other 
states to follow, notwithstanding constitutionality of each element); Chung, 
supra note 5, at 701; Honor Moore, The Public Pension Problem, 21 ELDER 
L.J. 249, 253 (2014) (“[E]valuating Rhode Island’s pension reform and legal 
challenges can provide insight into how Illinois, and other states ’ pension 
reforms, will be challenged and how they will fare in court.”).  
 7.  See discussion infra Part I.A (examining the implementation of a 
“hybrid” public pension system in lieu of the existing traditional “defined 
benefit” plan); Part I.B (exploring the cost-of-living-adjustment (“COLA”) 
suspension and permanent reduction); Part I.C (discussing the increase in 
retirement age).   
 8.  See discussion infra Part II.A  (discussing whether the state law, in 
fact, substantially impairs a contractual relationship); Part II.B (discussing 
whether the state can show a legitimate public purpose behind the 
regulation); Part II.C (discussing whether the modification of the rights and 
responsibilities of the parties to the contract is nonetheless reasonable and 
necessary in light of the public purpose). 
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to RIRSA currently pending in the Rhode Island Superior Court,9 
and moves on to an application of all the elements of a Contract 
Clause challenge to RIRSA de novo.  Section IV concludes the 
analysis and finds that RIRSA, as it was enacted, cannot survive a 
Contract Clause challenge and is, therefore, unconstitutional. 
I. RHODE ISLAND’S PUBLIC PENSION REFORM AND THE SUBSTANCE OF 
RIRSA 
At the time RIRSA was passed in 2011, Rhode Island was 
amid a period of economic decline so bleak that it prompted one 
commentator to hyperbolically characterize the state as “an 
American Greece.”10  To many Rhode Islanders, the widespread 
media coverage of the unstable economic conditions in Rhode 
Island was “almost too ubiquitous to warrant repeating,”11 but a 
brief review is necessary for the purposes of context.  The 
American economy suffered greatly over a period of time between 
approximately 2008 and 2009 which has been colloquially coined 
“The Great Recession.”12  While every state felt the ripple effect of 
the economic stagnation and decline, few were as dramatically 
impacted as Rhode Island.13  The Ocean State suffered from a 
 
 9.  As of this writing, the litigation remains pending, although 
settlement negotiations between the state and the union plaintiffs are 
ongoing.  A majority of the plaintiffs have voted to settle, but some claims 
have yet to be resolved.  See Tom Mooney & Katherine Gregg, ‘An awesome 
achievement:’  Williams announces pension deal with public employees, 
PROVIDENCE J. (Apr. 2, 2015, 5:54 PM), http://www.providencejournal.com/ 
article/20150402/NEWS/150409837/13943.   
 10.  See David Von Drehle, The Little State That Could, TIME, Dec. 5, 
2011, at, 30, 32, available at http://www.law.yale.edu/documents/ 
pdf/cbl/Rhode_Island_Materials.pdf. 
 11.  Andre S. Digou, A View of the Rhode Island Pension Landscape: The 
Potential Reform of Local Pension Plans Under the Preemption Doctrine, 19 
ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. REV. 740, 746 (2014). 
 12.  See, e.g., Ben Stevermen, The Great Recession Put Us in a Hole. Are 
We Out Yet?, BLOOMBERG BUS. (Oct. 27, 2014, 10:29 AM), 
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2014-10-27/the-great-recession-put-us-in-a-
hole-are-we-out-yet-.html; see also The Recession of 2007–2009, U.S. BUREAU 
OF LAB. STAT. (Feb. 2012), http://www.bls.gov/spotlight/2012/recession/. 
 13.  See ANTHONY RANDAZZO, PENSION REFORM CASE STUDY: RHODE 
ISLAND, POLICY STUDY 428, 1, 8–10 (2014), available at http:// 
reason.org/files/pension_reform_rhode_island.pdf; Von Drehle, supra note 10, 
at 32, 34; Mary Williams Walsh, The Little State with a Big Mess, N.Y. TIMES 
(Oct. 22, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/10/23/business/for-rhode-
island-the-pension-crisis-is-now.html?_r=2&pagewanted=all.  
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wide array of internal and external financial issues that were 
greatly exacerbated by this economic event.14  Joblessness in the 
state climbed to ten and three-fifths percent, compared to the 2011 
national average of nine and one-tenth.15  Textile and jewelry 
manufacturing in the state had largely dried up, and the majority 
of employers in the nation’s smallest state—healthcare and 
education—were, and still are, largely dependent on government 
spending.16 
It was amid this economically vulnerable period that many 
states, including Rhode Island, decided that much of the internal 
state debt could be alleviated or mitigated by reforming the public 
pension system.17  Rhode Island’s public pension system suffered 
from years of failed investment gambles and general neglect by 
the executive and legislative branches.18  The well documented 
“decades of drift, denial, and inaction” by the Rhode Island 
government had rendered the state’s $14.8 billion pension system 
extremely inefficient and vulnerable.19  In 2011, ten cents of every 
tax dollar went toward maintaining the grossly neglected pension 
system.20  Gina Raimondo—then the face of Rhode Island’s 
pension reform movement in her capacity as then General 
Treasurer and now Governor of the State—contributed to the 
tension in the state between wary tax payers and loyal public 
employees by agreeing with the sentiment that the public 
employees “have an unbelievably rich Cadillac plan” that needed 
to be scaled back.21  While piecemeal legislation was put in place 
 
 14.  See Walsh, supra note 13. 
 15.  Id.  
 16.  See id.   
 17.  See AMY MONAHAN, AM. ENTER. INST., UNDERSTANDING THE LEGAL 
LIMITS ON PUBLIC PENSION REFORM at 4–7 (2013), available at 
http://www.aei.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/05/-understanding-the-legal-limi 
ts-on-public-pension-reform_104816268458.pdf; Buck, supra note 6, at 27–28.  
 18.  See Von Drehle, supra note 10, at 32; Walsh, supra note 13.  
 19.  Walsh, supra note 13; see also RANDAZZO, supra note 13, at 6. 
 20.  Walsh, supra note 13.  
 21.  Mike Stanton, General Treasurer Gina Raimondo wants long-term 
solution to underfunded pension system, PROVIDENCE J. (Apr. 9, 2011, 12:01 
AM), http://www.providencejournal.com/article/20110409/BUSINESS/30409 
9999/0/SEARCH.  But see ROBERT HILTONSMITH, ECON. POL’Y INST., RHODE 
ISLAND’S NEW HYBRID PENSION PLAN WILL COST THE STATE MORE WHILE 
REDUCING RETIREE BENEFITS (2013), available at http://www.epi.org/ 
publication/ib366-rhode-islands-hybrid-pension-plan/ (characterizing the 
public pension system in Rhode Island prior to RIRSA ’s reforms as “not 
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to attempt to alter the system in some way, Rhode Island took 
“unprecedented” steps to totally warp the public pension system in 
the state with the introduction of RIRSA.22 
It was amid this tumultuous backdrop of economic 
uncertainty that RIRSA was passed.  Although RIRSA 
encountered strong criticism from the general public, the General 
Assembly nevertheless passed the reform bill in 2011.23  Now 
applauded by parties who likewise wish to dramatically reduce the 
state government’s financial obligations to the state public 
pension system, RIRSA represents the high-water mark for state 
pension reform.24 
As a practical matter, it is worth noting at this point that 
state pension program implementation and interpretation are 
regulated and maintained by the states themselves, rather than 
the federal government.25  As such, the legal status of public 
pensions varies from state to state.26  Although historically seen 
as gratuities from the government, the states have almost 
uniformly rejected that theory in lieu of “contract” or “property” 
theories, which view public pensions as contractually protected 
promises from the government or property rights, respectively.27  
Rhode Island has adopted a form of the contractual theory of 
public pensions.28  Although this puts Rhode Island in the 
majority, different interpretations and applications of the 
Contract Clause and its analytic test create scattered and often 
unpredictable results regarding issues of precisely when an 
 
particularly generous” compared to the majority of other states). 
 22.  MONIQUE MORRISSEY, ECON. POL’Y INST., TRUTH IN NUMBERS? A BRIEF 
HISTORY OF CUTS TO THE EMPLOYEES’ RETIREMENT SYSTEM OF RHODE ISLAND 1, 
6–8 (2013), available at http://www.epi.org/publication/bp363-brief-history-of-
cuts-to-the-employees-retirement-system-of-rhode-island/.  
 23.  See Walsh, supra note 13. 
 24.  See MONAHAN, supra note 17, at 7; MORRISSEY, supra note 22, at 1, 7. 
 25.  See Amy Monahan, Public Pension Plan Reform: The Legal 
Framework, 5 EDUC. FIN. & POL’Y 617, 626 (2010). 
 26.  See Moore, supra note 6, at 266.  
 27.  See Terry A. M. Mumford & Mary Leto Pareja, The Employer’s 
(In)ability to Reduce Retirement Benefits in the Public Sector, ALI-ABA 
COURSE STUDY, Sept. 11, 1997, at 34–36, 38–49, available at WESTLAW, 
SC14 ALI-ABA 27. 
 28.  See id. at 37; see also Bristol/Warren Reg’l Sch. Emps. v. Chafee, No. 
PC 12-3168, 2014 WL 1743142, at *15 (R.I. Super. Ct. Apr. 25, 2014) 
(acknowledging that the Rhode Island Supreme Court has adopted a middle-
ground approach between pure contract models and a gratuity model).  
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employee has a vested contractual right in their retirement 
benefits.29  To appreciate the sweeping breadth of this legislation, 
one must first look at some of the most dramatic alterations 
implemented by RIRSA.  The next Sections will briefly explain the 
nature, function, and effect of RIRSA’s most controversial 
elements. 
A. Transformation of the Retirement System from the Existing 
Traditional “Defined Benefit Plan” to a Unique “Hybrid Plan”30 
Traditionally, retirement benefit systems are categorized into 
two distinct categories: defined benefit plans and defined 
contribution plans.  Generally speaking, defined benefit plans are 
associated with public or “government” retirement systems, while 
defined contribution plans have recently been almost exclusively 
associated with private retirement systems that fall under the 
broad aegis of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 
1974 (“ERISA”).31  The differences between these two types of 
pension structures are crucial to the expectations and actual 
benefits enjoyed by the employee.32 
Simplistically, in a defined benefit structure, the employer 
bears the burden “to contribute funds to the pension plan on an 
actuarially sound basis so that sufficient funds exist to pay the 
worker when he or she retires.”33  This places the market risks on 
the employer to “invest enough in the present to fund the ongoing 
pension expenses that largely involve pension payments to current 
retirees.”34  “The minimum funding of a defined benefit plan is 
 
 29.  Some states (e.g., California) have held that pension benefits vest at 
the beginning of employment, while other states have held that no benefit 
has vested until the end of employment.  See infra notes 172–75.  While 
Rhode Island seems to fall into a more flexible category somewhere in 
between these two extremes, the issue of contractual vesting greatly 
complicates the following issues.  However, a full discussion of the various 
subsets of plaintiffs in this case and their unique vesting provisions is outside 
the scope of this Comment and will not be discussed at great length.  For a 
more comprehensive discussion of vesting issues in pension reform across the 
country, see Mumford & Leto Pareja, supra note 27, at 39–40. 
 30.  See R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 36-10.3-1 to -12 (2012). 
 31.  See Paul M. Secunda, Constitutional Contract Clause Challenges in 
Public Pension Litigation, 28 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L. J. 263, 267–68 (2011). 
 32.  See id. at 268–69. 
 33.  Id. at 268. 
 34.  Id. at 268–69.  
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calculated based on a complex actuarial analysis revolving around 
factors such as age, length of service, projected future salary 
increases, and rate of return on plan investments.”35  In essence, 
defined contribution plans are generally more desirable for the 
majority of employees because the majority of the financial risk 
and investment burdens are borne by the employer as opposed to 
a potentially financially illiterate, disinterested, or otherwise 
insufficiently sophisticated employee.36 
By contrast, defined contribution plans shift this economic 
liability from the employer to the employee.  The employer will 
provide a menu of investment options for the employee and may or 
may not match the employee’s salary contribution to the fund, 
thereby usually ending any further obligation to provide funding 
to the pension.37  Under this structure, the employee bears all 
respective risks including: “risk of longevity[,] risk of investment 
return[,] and risk on inflation.”38  The benefit of such a system, of 
course, is the portability of a consumer-driven system that allows 
employees to have more control over their pensions.39  However, 
the policy argument evaluating the comparative advantages and 
disadvantages between defined contribution and defined benefit 
structures has largely been enclosed to the ERISA-governed 
private-sector.40 
Perhaps the most noticeable element of RIRSA is the 
abandonment of a pure traditional defined benefit structure in 
lieu of a “hybrid” structure that establishes a defined contribution 
fund, which ideally operates in tandem with the existing defined 
benefit plan that has been in place.41  Under RIRSA, public 
employees retain all benefits accrued as of June 30, 2012, but 
 
 35.  Id. at 269.  
 36.  See id. at 268–69.  
 37.  See id. at 269.  To further illustrate this point, consider a standard 
401(k) retirement plan.  A 401(k) is a basic defined contribution retirement 
plan.  Employees have a defined contribution amount that they contribute to 
the plan, which may be matched by an employer.  It differs from a defined 
benefit plan in that employees have no guaranteed income from a 401(k) or 
defined contribution plan.  The performance of their retirement accounts is 
subject to the market performance of the investments in the plan and, thus, 
is not guaranteed. 
 38.  Id.  
 39.  See id. 
 40.  See id. at 269–70.  
 41.  See RANDAZZO, supra note 13, at 18–19. 
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after that date, the employees are enrolled in a mandatory system 
that retains vestiges of the previous defined benefit plan; but the 
new plan also compels employees to participate in a mandatory 
defined contribution fund.42  Under this plan, “each participant 
contributes 8.75% of their base pay, of which 3.75% is contributed 
to the [defined benefit] and 5% is contributed to the [defined 
contribution] plan.”43  “The state (or municipality responsible) also 
contributes 1% to the participant’s [defined contribution] plan.”44  
This keeps the contribution rates for public employees at the same 
rate (eight and three-fourths percent), but puts more than half of 
this contribution (five percent) in a defined contribution plan.45 
While it is beyond the scope of this Comment to fully evaluate 
the benefits and burdens of a defined contribution plan as opposed 
to a defined benefit plan, the fact of the matter is that this shift to 
a partial defined contribution plan has been perceived as highly 
controversial.46 Employees who enter the public-sector in Rhode 
Island expect to have a defined benefit plan rather than a defined 
contribution plan or some amalgamation of both.  Moreover, the 
innate market risks are largely shifted from the state employer to 
public employee.  This was a major issue of contention in the past 
RIRSA litigation.47 
B. “Cost-of-Living Adjustment” Suspension & Permanent 
Reduction48 
COLAs are a dynamic part of public pension systems.  
According to a National Association of State Retirement 
Administrators (“NASRA”) issue brief, the general purpose of 
 
 42.  See id.; Digou, supra note 11, at 750–52. 
 43.  Digou, supra note 11, at 750. 
 44.  Id.; see also Jack M. Beermann, Resolving the Public Pension 
“Crisis,” 41 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 999, 1004–06 (2014) (pointing to the means to 
avoid contributory obligations that are unavailable to states, but are 
available to municipalities, namely: bankruptcy and the issuance of bonds); 
Christopher D. Hu, Note, Reforming Public Pensions In Rhode Island, 23 
STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 523, 524, 529 (2012) (introducing the obligation 
imposed on municipalities to develop their own pension systems as a major 
element of RIRSA).   
 45.  HILTONSMITH, supra note 21, at 4.  
 46.  See HILTONSMITH, supra note 21, at 1–6; Hu, supra note 44, at 528. 
 47.  See, e.g., HILTONSMITH, supra note 21, at 1–6; RANDAZZO, supra note 
13, at 18; Secunda, supra note 31, at 268–71; Hu, supra note 44, at 528.  
 48.  See R.I. GEN. LAW § 36-10-35 (2014). 
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COLAs are to “offset or reduce effects of inflation on retirement 
income” in an apparent effort to keep the retiree’s spending power 
relatively consistent over time.49  As the rate of inflation is 
adjustable depending on a variety of factors, presumably so too is 
the COLA.  However, it is worth noting the basic principle that 
inflation constantly increases the cost of goods and services in the 
economy; thus, with most COLAs the adjustment percentage 
generally increases in order to protect a retiree’s spending power.  
One of RIRSA’s key provisions suspends and reduces COLAs.50 
In the “Legislative Intent and Findings” section of RIRSA, the 
legislature states that “[t]he vast majority of unfunded liability for 
[the public pension system] is attributable to service rendered by 
employees who have already retired, and a very significant portion 
of this unfunded liability is represented by future cost of living 
adjustments (COLAs).”51  Accordingly, the legislature warned that 
“it is essential that the COLA benefits for retirees be impacted as 
part of this comprehensive reform of the retirement system.”52  
Although going forward the reader is presumably braced for an 
impact on COLA benefits, the substance of the COLA reductions 
are still remarkably ambitious. 
Most notably, RIRSA suspends annual COLAs for retired 
state employees for an indeterminate amount of time.53  
Specifically, the retirees will not be entitled to COLAs under 
RIRSA until their individual pension plan is eighty percent 
funded overall.54  Filling these coffers will be no easy task given 
the gross underfunding that provoked RIRSA.  At the time the 
 
 49.  NASRA, COST-OF-LIVING ADJUSTMENTS 1 (2014), available at 
http://www.nasra.org/content.asp?contentid=125. 
 50.  R.I. GEN. LAW § 36-10-35 (2014).  See also Buck, supra note 6, at 71–
73 (citing various cases in which courts had previously struck down efforts to 
reduce COLAs).  But see Justus v. State, 336 P.3d 202, 205, 212–13 (Colo. 
2014).  In Justus v. State, the court held that a Contract Clause challenge to 
a Colorado pension reform provision, which decreased COLA percentages 
from a fixed three-and-a-half percent rate to a formulaic calculation that was 
capped at two percent, failed because the plaintiffs did not establish that 
there was, in fact, a contractual relationship between the government and 
the employees.  Id.  The court relied on the fact that the legislature 
frequently altered the COLA percentages and, thus, made no clear indication 
that they intended the relationship to be contractually binding in nature.  Id. 
 51.  2011 R.I. Pub. Laws 408, § 1 (a)(10).  
 52.  Id.  
 53.  See Hu, supra note 44, at 527. 
 54.  See id.  
BURNHAMFINAL EDITW ORD.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)  5/19/2015  1:19 PM 
2015] RHODE ISLAND’S SACRIFICIAL ECONOMIC LAMB  533 
legislation was passed, the pension plans were only forty-eight 
percent funded.55  The concerns surrounding the eighty percent 
mark are exacerbated when one considers the unpredictability of 
financial returns on Rhode Island’s aggressive hedge fund 
investments of public pension money.56  It is estimated that it will 
take at least sixteen years for the pension system to be eighty 
percent funded.57  This means that retired state employees will 
not receive a substantial adjustment in their benefits, regardless 
of how expensive living becomes, for more than a decade and a 
half, at best. 
Retirees are, however, entitled to an “interim” COLA once 
every five years, but the calculation of this COLA “is capped at 4% 
and applied only to the retiree’s first $25,000 of pension income.”58  
Even if the pension system is eventually eighty percent funded, 
this same capped formula will continue to apply going forward.59  
Thus, this element of RIRSA also represents a permanent 
reduction to the COLA benefits for new employees, current 
employees, and even current retirees.60  The net effect of the 
provision is to calculate an adjustment on the basis of only a 
percentage of a retiree’s pension income, rather than the full 
amount—decreasing the effect of the adjustment and leaving large 
portions of income subject to inflation.  Even with the limited 
interim payment, most retirees will not be able to rely on a COLA 
 
 55.  See id. 
 56.  See David Sirota, Rhode Island Has Lost $372 Million As State 
Shifted Pension Cash to Wall Street, INT’L BUS. TIMES (Aug. 28, 2014, 1:34 
PM), http://www.ibtimes.com/rhode-island-has-lost-372-million-state-shifted-
pension-cash-wall-street-1671790. 
 57.  See, e.g., Bristol/Warren Reg’l Sch. Emps. v. Chafee, No. PC 12-3168, 
2014 WL 1743142, at *6 (R.I. Super. Ct. Apr. 25, 2014). 
 58.  Hu, supra note 44, at 527.  Outside of the four percent cap, this is 
also substantively different in the sense that, originally, this was out of the 
first $35,000.  According to some reports, the final settlement offer from the 
State contained concessions at this point of contention between the parties in 
the RIRSA lawsuit.  See Rhode Island’s Landmark Pension Reform Could Be 
Adjusted Under Proposed Settlement Agreement, CIVIC FEDERATION (April 4, 
2014, 10:27 AM), http://www.civicfed.org/iifs/blog/rhode-island%E2%80%99s-
landmark-pension-reforms-could-be-adjusted-under-proposed-settlement-
agreem. 
 59.  See id. at 527 n.31. 
 60.  See Bristol/Warren Reg’l Sch. Emps., 2014 WL 1743142, at *5–6; 
Chung, supra note 5, at 704. 
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to combat the effects of inflation.61  Additionally, this provision is 
a permanent reduction to COLA benefits for future retirees.62 
C.  Retirement Age Increase63 
RIRSA increases the eligible minimum retirement age for 
almost all public employees.64  Changes to employee retirement 
plans raise substantial fairness concerns on the basis of an 
employee’s reliance on a set retirement scheme.65  RIRSA does 
mitigate this concern to some degree by raising the retirement age 
in a way that is prorated based on previous years of service.66  An 
additional concern is that increasing “the retirement age during 
one’s working life inherently reduces the present value of all past 
accruals, because that present value would have to have been 
calculated by discounting for a longer period.”67 
In terms of prorating the retirement age to avoid situations of 
obvious unfairness, RIRSA eliminates the possibility that an 
employee will be forced to work extra years on the eve of her 
retirement by excluding employees who were already eligible to 
retire as of July 1, 2012—the day the law took effect—from the 
retirement age increase.68  For any employee with less than five 
years of service on June 30, 2012, RIRSA automatically increases 
the retirement age to the Social Security retirement age, changing 
the eligible age for retirement from sixty-two to sixty-seven.69  For 
 
 61.  See Hu, supra note 44, at 527. 
 62.  R.I. GEN. LAWS § 36-10-35 (Supp. 2014); see also Chung, supra note 5, 
at 704.  
 63.  See R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 36-10-9 to -10 (2011 & Supp. 2014).  
 64.  Id.; see also Moore, supra note 6, at 270; Hu, supra note 44, at 524. 
 65.  See Buck, supra note 6, at 77. 
 66.  See id. at 78.  
 67.  See id. at 79.  Buck provides an example to further illustrate this 
concern:  
[I]f I am thirty-five and now have to work to age [sixty-seven] rather 
than age sixty-two, the then-present value of what I earned at age 
twenty-five, twenty-six, twenty-seven, etc., would all have been 
determined by discounting back from age [sixty-seven] rather than 
sixty-two, and with any discount rate above zero, that will 
automatically make the present value of those accruals lower. 
Id.  This can be thought of as retroactively reducing the present value of 
previous accruals.  See id.  
 68.  See id. at 78. 
 69.  Id.  Buck argues that this increase is reasonable because younger 
employees presumably “do not yet have a substantial interest in retiring at 
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in-between employees who, at the time RIRSA takes effect, have 
five years or more of service in the public-sector—or are otherwise 
eligible for retirement at the original age of sixty-two—the 
retirement age is calculated by “adjust[ing] downward in 
proportion to the amount of service the member has earned as of 
June 30, 2012.”70  “In other words, the formula in Rhode Island 
now prorates any increase in retirement age in inverse proportion 
to how many years the employee had already worked toward the 
previous retirement age.”71 
II. CONTRACT CLAUSE JURISPRUDENCE 
Rhode Island’s constitution states that “[n]o . . . law impairing 
the obligation of contracts, shall be passed.”72  This language 
mirrors the Contract Clause of the United States Constitution.73  
As such, the tests adopted by the United States Supreme Court for 
Contract Clause challenges have been substantially followed by 
the Rhode Island Supreme Court.74  Although the test to be 
applied in a Contract Clause challenge differs depending upon the 
character of the contract in question, RIRSA affects solely public 
contracts between state employees and the state itself; this 
analysis proceeds under the test governing public-sector 
contracts.75  The state constitution of Rhode Island and its 
interpretations in state court are the only binding forms of 
authority relied on throughout this Comment.76 
 
some earlier age.”  Id.  Note that the normal retirement age was sixty-five 
after ten years of service and sixty-two after twenty-nine years of service.  
See HILTONSMITH, supra note 21, at 3. 
 70.  R.I. GEN. LAWS § 36-10-9(1)(a)(ii) (Supp. 2014).  See also Buck, supra 
note 6, at 78 (providing two examples of how this calculation operates). 
 71.  Buck, supra note 6, at 79.  
 72.  R.I. CONST. art 1, § 12. 
 73.  U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1 (“No State shall . . . pass any . . . Law 
impairing the Obligation of Contracts . . .”). 
 74.  See, e.g., R.I. Insurers’ Insolvency Fund v. Leviton Mfg. Co., Inc., 716 
A.2d 730, 736 (R.I. 1998); R.I. Depositors Corp. v. Brown, 659 A.2d 95, 106 
(R.I. 1995). 
 75.  Note that the ultimate purpose of this Comment is to address 
RIRSA’s infringement on the contract between the public employees and the 
State.  Therefore, there will be an increased focus on alleged contracts in 
which the government is a party as opposed to legislative infringement of 
private contracts.  However, much of the analysis is similar between these 
two categories of contracts, so this distinction will not be exclusive.  
 76.  See, e.g., Monahan, supra note 25, at 620.  It is worth noting that 
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The test consists of a three pronged inquiry: (1) whether the 
state law in question substantially impairs a contractual 
relationship (“Prong I” or “first prong”);77 if so, (2) whether the 
state can show a legitimate public purpose behind the regulation 
(“Prong II” or “second prong”);78 and, (3) whether the modification 
of the rights and responsibilities of the parties to the contract is 
nonetheless reasonable and necessary in light of the public 
purpose (“Prong III” or “third prong”).79  This test can be 
understood as a series of “hurdles” for the parties to clear.  The 
“height” of each hurdle varies depending on the nature of the 
contract that a law substantially impairs—different tests are 
prescribed for private and public contracts.80 
The distinction between private and public contracts81 is 
 
Rhode Island’s largest public employee union approved a pension settlement 
plan on March 27, 2015.  See Katherine Gregg, R.I.’s largest public employee 
union approves pension settlement plan, PROVIDENCE J. (Mar. 27, 2015, 3:37 
PM), http://www.providencejournal.com/article/20150327/NEWS/150329314. 
 77.  E.g., Energy Reserves Grp., Inc. v. Kan. Power & Light Co., 459 U.S. 
400, 411 (1983); R.I. Insurers’ Insolvency Fund, 716 A.2d at 736.  Note that 
many contemporary Contract Clause challenges falter at this stage.  See, e.g., 
R.I. Insurers’ Insolvency Fund, 716 A.2d at 736.  
 78.  E.g., R.I. Depositors Corp., 659 A.2d at 106. 
 79.  E.g., U.S. Trust Co. of N.Y. v. New Jersey, 431 U.S. 1, 26 (1977).  
Note that the Supreme Court of Rhode Island has framed the Contract 
Clause test in the following way:  
A court first must determine whether a contract exists.  If a contract 
exists, the court then must determine whether the modification 
results in an impairment of that contract and, if so, whether this 
impairment can be characterized as substantial.  Finally, if it is 
determined that the impairment is substantial, the court then must 
inquire whether the impairment, nonetheless, is reasonable and 
necessary to fulfill an important public purpose.  
Nonnenmacher v. City of Warwick, 722 A.2d 1199, 1202 (R.I. 1999) (citations 
omitted).  Despite the structural difference, the Rhode Island Contract 
Clause test operates in the same fashion as the Supreme Court Contract 
Clause test. 
 80.  Compare R.I. Insurers’ Insolvency Fund, 716 A.2d at 736–37 
(applying the Contract Clause test to a case of private contractual 
impairment), with Nonnenmacher, 722 A.2d at 1202–04 (applying the 
Contract Clause test to a case of public contractual impairment and, while 
finding the law to be constitutional in the face of the Contract Clause, still 
promulgating a different test to be applied to public contracts). 
 81.  For the sake of clarity, “private contracts” in this context refers to a 
contract involving two independent private entities, and “public contracts” in 
this context refers to contracts between the government and some other 
entity, such as state employees.  
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material in public pension reform laws, such as RIRSA, because 
the government is a party to the public contract impaired by its 
own passage of a law.82  In cases of private contracts, the first 
hurdle (Prong I) is relatively static and somewhat easy to 
overcome for the plaintiff.83  At Prongs II and III of the analysis, 
however, the hurdles for the government—to articulate a 
legitimate public purpose for the law and to justify the law as 
“reasonable” in light of those public purposes—are similarly low 
when private contracts are at issue as a result of judicial 
deference to state legislatures.84  By contrast, with the public-
sector contract analysis, the hurdles at Prongs II and III are 
substantially higher for the government to surpass.  The Supreme 
Court explained this rule in United States Trust Co. of New York 
v. New Jersey, stating that “complete deference to a legislative 
assessment of reasonableness and necessity is not appropriate 
because the State’s self-interest is at stake.”85  Establishing the 
existence of a contract, and substantial impairment of that 
contract, is more difficult for plaintiffs because of the higher 
judicial scrutiny public contracts receive when searching for both 
existence and impairment.86  As the First Circuit reasoned in 
Parella v. Retirement Board of Rhode Island Employees’ 
Retirement System, this heightened burden is justified because the 
existence of a public contractual obligation means that a 
subsequent legislature is not free to significantly impair that 
obligation for merely rational reasons.87 
It is also important to note that, despite the Contract Clause 
test’s superficial similarity to rational basis review, it does not 
apply that standard.  Rational basis review inquires into whether 
the means used by the government are rationally related to a 
legitimate government purpose.88  The Contract Clause test asks 
 
 82.  See U.S. Trust Co. of N.Y., 431 U.S. at 26. 
 83.  See, e.g., Allied Structural Steel Co. v. Spannaus, 438 U.S. 234, 238–
43 (1978). 
 84.  See, e.g., id. 
 85.  431 U.S. at 26.  See also Leo Clarke, The Contract Clause: A Basis for 
Limited Judicial Review of State Economic Regulation, 39 U. MIAMI L. REV. 
183, 194–98 (1985). 
 86.  See, e.g., Parella v. Ret. Bd. of R.I. Emps. Ret. Sys., 173 F.3d 46, 60 
(1st Cir. 1999) (citing Dodge v. Bd. of Educ., 302 U.S. 74, 79 (1937)). 
 87.  Id. 
 88.  See, e.g., Williamson v. Lee Optical of Okla., Inc., 348 U.S. 483, 488–
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whether a law’s means are reasonable and necessary to achieve a 
legitimate government purpose.89  Rational basis review makes no 
inquiry into the reasonableness of a law’s means, only its 
rationality.  Likewise, rational basis review does not require a 
law’s means be necessary, only that it rationally relates to the 
purposes asserted.  It appears clear that while Contract Clause 
review does not rise to the exacting levels of scrutiny afforded in 
intermediate and strict scrutiny, it is nonetheless a more 
searching inquiry than rational basis review.90 
The language of the Contract Clause itself is deceptively 
simple.  The government cannot pass any law that impairs the 
obligation of contracts.91  It is well settled, however, that the 
language of the Contract Clause is not rigidly applied to all 
impairments of contracts.  The Supreme Court noted in Home 
Building & Loan Ass’n v. Blaisdell that “the prohibition is not an 
absolute one and is not to be read with literal exactness like a 
mathematical formula.”92  This has the effect of rendering 
application of the Contract Clause problematic: outcomes are 
dependent upon judicial interpretations of reasonableness, which 
necessarily invite a great deal of subjective, context-sensitive 
decision-making.  This makes it difficult for parties challenging 
legislation to overcome the initial hurdle of establishing that a law 
substantially impairs a contractual relationship.93  Additionally, 
this also opens the door for the introduction of the ever-enigmatic 
“police power” doctrine as a justification for invasive state 
legislation.94  Before a court enters these murky, analytic waters, 
however, a Contract Clause challenge must first satisfy the 
baseline inquiries concerning the existence of a contract.  The 
following subsections will provide an overview of each prong of a 
 
91 (1955). 
 89. Compare Williamson, 348 U.S. at 488–91, with U.S. Trust Co. of N.Y., 
431 U.S. at 20–29.  See also Parella, 173 F.3d at 60. 
 90.  See generally Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003) (utilizing the 
strict scrutiny standard); United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515 (1996) 
(utilizing an intermediate scrutiny review). 
 91.  See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1; R.I. CONST. art. 1, § 12.  
 92.  290 U.S. 398, 428 (1934). 
 93.  See, e.g., Nonnenmacher v. City of Warwick, 722 A.2d 1199, 1203–04 
(R.I. 1999); Retired Adjunct Professors of R.I. v. Almond, 690 A.2d 1342, 1347 
(R.I. 1997). 
 94.  See, e.g., U.S. Trust Co. N.Y., 431 U.S. at 21–24; Clarke, supra note 
85, at 245–52. 
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public Contract Clause analysis. 
A. Has the State Law Substantially Impaired a Contractual 
Relationship? 
The first element of a Contract Clause challenge is the most 
important and difficult element for a plaintiff to overcome.  This 
threshold inquiry establishes exactly whether a contract has been 
impaired and to what degree.  It is, therefore, largely 
determinative of the outcome of the case.  In the case of public 
pension reform, for example, there are diverse subsets of plaintiffs 
with potentially very different contractual relationships with the 
state depending on the time of service and nature of 
employment.95  This step is essential in defining the scope of the 
“obligation” owed to the impaired party.96  As the First Circuit 
noted: 
Finding a public contractual obligation has considerable 
effect.  It means that a subsequent legislature is not free 
to significantly impair that obligation for merely rational 
reasons.  Because of this constraint on subsequent 
legislatures, and thus on subsequent decisions by those 
who represent the public, there is, for the purposes of the 
Contract Clause, a higher burden to establish that a 
contractual obligation has been created.97 
Although commentators criticize this rationale and it is not 
universally binding, it underscores the general difficulties that 
challengers alleging an unconstitutional violation of a public 
contract will encounter at Prong I of a Contract Clause analysis.98  
This initial inquiry—has the state law, in fact, substantially 
impaired a contractual relationship—is composed of at least three 
sub-inquiries.  The three sub-inquires of this element are: (a) 
whether there is a contractual relationship; if so (b) whether a 
change in the law impairs that contractual relationship; and (c) 
 
 95.  See Buck, supra note 6, at 49–65. 
 96.  See, e.g., Edwards v. Kearzey, 96 U.S. 595, 600 (1877) (“The 
obligation of a contract includes every thing within its obligatory scope.”). 
 97.  Parella v. Ret. Bd. of R.I. Emps. Ret. Sys., 173 F.3d 46, 60 (1st Cir. 
1999). 
 98.  See Buck, supra note 6, at 51–52.  
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whether that impairment is substantial.99 
i. Whether There is a Contractual Relationship 
In cases involving alleged government contracts, as opposed 
to private contracts, the Supreme Court of the United States has 
instructed lower courts to proceed cautiously in determining 
whether a state intended to contractually bind itself by statute.100  
Specifically, courts have been instructed to look for a clear 
indication that the legislature has intended to be bound.101  Thus, 
absent clear statutory language indicating intent on behalf of the 
government to establish a contractual right, it is presumed that 
the legislature merely made a law to establish a policy of the state 
which, unlike a contract, is inherently subject to revision and 
repeal.102  This rule of construction, generally referred to as “the 
unmistakability doctrine,” has been said to “balance ‘the 
Government’s need for freedom to legislate with its obligation to 
honor its contracts.’”103  “[T]he government may not use these 
doctrines simply ‘as a means to escape from contracts that it 
subsequently concluded were unwise.’”104 
Courts are not limited to only the literal text of the statute as 
criteria for the purposes of determining the state’s intent to be 
contractually bound.105  The reviewing court may use apparent 
 
 99.  E.g., Gen. Motors Corp. v. Romein, 503 U.S. 181, 186 (1992). 
 100.  Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Atchison Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. Co., 
470 U.S. 451, 465–66 (1985). 
 101.  Id. 
 102.  Id.  The Supreme Court of the United States elaborated on the 
distinction between policies and contracts as follows:  
This well-established presumption is grounded in the elementary 
proposition that the principal function of a legislature is not to make 
contracts, but to make laws that establish the policy of the state.  
Policies, unlike contracts, are inherently subject to revision and 
repeal, and to construe laws as contracts when the obligation is not 
clearly and unequivocally expressed would be to limit drastically the 
essential powers of the legislative body. 
Id. (citation omitted). 
 103.  R.I. Pub. Emps.’ Retiree Coal. v. Chafee, C.A. No. PC 12-3166, 2014 
WL 1577496, at *6 (R.I. Super. Ct. Apr. 16, 2014) (quoting Connor Bros. 
Constr. Co., Inc. v.  Geren, 550 F.3d 1368. 1371–72 (Fed. Cir. 2008)). 
 104.  R.I. Council 94 v. Chafee, C.A. No. PC 12-3168, 2014 WL 1743149, at 
*13 (R.I. Super. Ct. Apr. 25, 2014) (quoting Connor Bros. Constr., 550 F.3d at 
1374).  
 105.  See, e.g., R.I. Laborers’ Dist. Council, Local Union 808 v. Rhode 
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purpose, context, legislative history, and any pertinent evidence to 
discern the actual intent of the legislature.106  As the United 
States Supreme Court put it in United States Trust Co. of New 
York, where the statute at issue is ambiguous, the reviewing court 
looks to whether “the language and circumstances evince a 
legislative intent to create private rights of a contractual nature 
enforceable against the State.”107  Nevertheless, overcoming the 
presumption that the government generally does not intend to 
create a private contractual right has proven difficult, and often 
fatal, for many Contract Clause claims.108 
ii.  Whether a Change in the Law Impairs that Contractual 
Relationship 
Once a contractual relationship is recognized, the court then 
engages in the process of evaluating the existence and extent of an 
impairment on that contractual relationship.  For this purpose of 
determining an “impairment,” the total destruction of a 
contractual obligation is not necessary.109  Rather, “legislation 
which deprives one of the benefit of a contract, or adds new duties 
or obligations thereto, necessarily impairs the obligation of the 
contract.”110  Additionally, “[l]egislation that reduces the value of 
 
Island, 145 F.3d 42, 44 (1st Cir. 1998).  But see McGrath v. R.I. Ret. Bd., By 
& Through Mayer, 906 F. Supp. 749, 759 (D.R.I. 1995) (stating that the most 
important indication of whether a statute constitutes a contractual offer is 
the language of the statute itself), aff’d sub nom. McGrath v. R.I. Ret. Bd., 88 
F.3d 12 (1st Cir. 1996). 
 106.  See McGrath, 906 F. Supp. at 761–62; accord R.I. GEN. LAWS § 36-10-
7 (2007) (“Guarantee by State – Annual Appropriations: The general 
assembly of the state of Rhode Island hereby declares that it is the intention 
of the state to make payment of the annuities, benefits, and retirement 
allowances provided for under the provisions of this chapter and to that end 
that it is the intention of the state to make the appropriations required by the 
state to meet its obligations to the extent provided in this chapter.”). 
 107.  431 U.S. 1, 17 n.14 (1977). 
 108.  See, e.g., Justus v. State, 336 P.3d 202, 208–09, 212–13 (Colo. 2014) 
(finding no evidence granting COLA benefits to retirees in a Colorado statute 
or in the legislative history of said statute that would be indicative of a “clear 
indication” of the legislature’s intent to be bound to provide a fixed COLA to 
members of a state retirement system throughout their retirement). 
 109.  See, e.g., Energy Reserves Grp., Inc. v. Kan. Power & Light Co., 459 
U.S. 400, 411 (1983). 
 110.  N. Pac. Ry. Co. v. Minnesota, 208 U.S. 583, 591 (1908). 
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a contract has also been found to be an impairment.”111  Generally 
speaking, most courts tend to view any legislative modification of 
a contractual right as an “impairment.”112 
iii.  Whether the Impairment is Substantial 
Even if a plaintiff can show a contractual relationship, and 
legislative impairment of that relationship, she must still 
demonstrate that the impairment is requisitely “substantial” to 
clear this initial hurdle of the Contract Clause test.113  The 
requisite “substantiality” of impairment that gives rise to a 
Contract Clause challenge is by no means a clearly defined 
standard.  A review of judicial history reveals an inconsistent 
evaluative methodology that, at times, borders on arbitrary.  The 
United States Supreme Court has provided very little guidance on 
how courts should evaluate the substantiality of a contractual 
impairment.114  For example, in the context of a private Contract 
Clause analysis it stated: 
The severity of an impairment of contractual obligations 
can be measured by the factors that reflect the high value 
the Framers placed on the protection of private contracts.  
 
 111.  MONAHAN, supra note 17, at 14 (citing Ret. Pub. Emps. of Wash. v. 
Charles, 62 P.3d 470, 482 (Wash. 2003)). 
 112.  It is of note that some federal district courts have attempted to 
sharpen this point of the Contract Clause analysis in favor of the state.  See, 
e.g., St. Paul Gaslight Co. v. St. Paul, 181 U.S. 142, 149–51 (1901); Univ. of 
Hawai’i Prof’l Assemb. v. Cayetano, 183 F.3d 1096, 1106–07 (9th Cir. 1999); 
Horwitz-Matthews, Inc. v. City of Chicago, 78 F.3d 1248, 1250 (7th Cir. 
1996).  The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals has articulated the stance that 
a mere breach of contract is insufficient to garner constitutional protection.  
Horwitz-Matthews, 78 F.3d at 1250.  The court reasoned that “[i]t would be 
absurd to turn every breach of contract by a state or municipality into a 
violation of the Federal Constitution.”  Id.  If a court adopts this logic, “[t]he 
crucial question becomes whether the plaintiffs . . . retain the right to recover 
damages for the breach.”  Secunda, supra note 31, at 286.  However, in the 
case of most public pension cases, “this threshold issue would not appear to 
be an obstacle as plaintiffs could normally contend that they were barred 
from recovering damages from the State as the result of the State ’s 
amendment of their pension plan.”  Id.  As such, it will not be addressed in 
this Comment. 
 113.  See Green v. Biddle, 21 U.S. 1, 84–85 (1823) (holding that, although 
changes to the terms of a contract, however minute, can impair the obligation 
of contract, the objection that a statute impairs the obligation of contract does 
not depend on the extent of the change which the law effect in it). 
 114.  See MONAHAN, supra note 17, at 8 n.9. 
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Contracts enable individuals to order their personal and 
business affairs according to their particular needs and 
interests. Once arranged, those rights and obligations are 
binding under the law, and the parties are entitled to rely 
on them.115 
The “substantial” element of a Contract Clause analysis 
becomes even murkier in cases of public contracts.  For example, 
the United States Supreme Court has acknowledged from the 
beginning that states may reserve the right to modify the terms of 
a contract.116  Today, courts have recognized that a general 
reservation of the right to modify is insufficient, however, “[i]f a 
state explicitly reserves the right to modify benefit levels, any 
subsequent modification may be considered an insubstantial 
impairment.”117  Thus, courts often consider whether the 
government in the past has regulated the industry that the 
complaining party has entered.118  If the court answers the 
question in the affirmative, it usually will conclude that the 
impairment has not risen to the necessary level of 
substantiality.119  In sum, a law will substantially impair a public 
contract when it alters an obligation that the government has 
intended to bind itself to in a manner that affects the obligations 
owed in a significant and meaningful manner.  The nebulousness 
of the inquiry into “substantiality” is problematic.  If a court 
determines that the alleged impairment is not substantial enough, 
it will decline to further analyze the challenge, thereby ending the 
inquiry and the lawsuit.  Moreover, the degree of judicial scrutiny 
exercised in the second and third prongs of the test is directly 
linked to the extent of the impairment deduced in the first 
prong.120  The severity of the impairment increases the level of 
scrutiny to which the legislation will be subjected.121 
 
 115.  Allied Steel Co. v. Spannus, 438 U.S. 234, 245 (1978).  See also 
MONAHAN, supra note 17, at 8 n.9. 
 116.  See, e.g., Trs. of Dartmouth Coll. v. Woodward, 17 U.S. 518, 683 
(1819) (Story, J., concurring). 
 117.  Mumford & Leto Pareja, supra note 27, at 35 (emphasis added). 
 118.  See, e.g., Energy Reserves Grp., Inc. v. Kan. Power & Light Co., 459 
U.S. 400, 411 (1983). 
 119.  See, e.g., id. at 411–12. 
 120.  See, e.g., id. at 411–13.  
 121.  See, e.g., id. at 411–12. 
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B.  Can the State Show a Legitimate Public Purpose Behind the 
Regulation? 
If the complaining party can overcome the initial hurdle of 
showing a substantial burden, the state must demonstrate a 
legitimate public purpose behind the challenged legislation. 
Articulating a legitimate public purpose is not a steep hurdle for 
the state to clear.  As the body of precedent on this concept in 
constitutional law is sufficiently dense, this Comment will only 
provide a cursory review of what constitutes a “legitimate public 
purpose” in a Contract Clause challenge.122 
In 1827, Chief Justice Marshall first recognized the “police 
power” of the states as a permissive basis for legislation.123  Police 
power has come to encompass the authority of the states “to 
provide for the public health, safety, and morals.”124  This 
umbrella of authority is intentionally broad, for among other 
reasons, to solidify principles of federalism and state autonomy.125  
Moreover, since the New Deal, the judiciary has generally given 
more deference to a state’s articulated “purpose” behind 
legislation.126  So long as the legislation is not facially abusive, the 
courts will generally recognize a purported government public 
purpose as “legitimate.”127 
For the purposes of a Contract Clause claim, it is difficult to 
 
 122.  For a more complete discussion of state police powers, see generally 
Legarre Santiago, The Historical Background of the Police Power, 9 U. PA. J. 
CONST. L. 745 (2007). 
 123.  Brown v. Maryland, 25 U.S 419, 443–44 (1827).  
 124.  See, e.g., Barnes v. Glen Theatre, 501 U.S. 560, 569 (1991). 
 125.  See Lynda J. Oswald, The Role of Deference in Judicial Review of 
Public Use Determinations, 39 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 243, 267 (2012). 
 126.  See generally David A. Strauss, Why Was Lochner Wrong?, 70 U. CHI. 
L. REV. 373 (2003) (analyzing contemporary elements of judicial review of 
state legislation in an effort to clarify the modern understanding of the 
infamous Lochner decision, which characterizes it as well outside the judicial 
mainstream).  See also Home Bldg. & Loan Ass ’n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398, 
419–22, 424–25 (1934) (discussing the interplay of the police power doctrine 
with the Contract Clause in consideration of the constitutionality of a 
Minnesota mortgagee relief statute enacted during the Great Depression).  
But see Richard A. Epstein, Toward a Revitalization of the Contract Clause, 
51 U. CHI. L. REV. 703, 735–40 (1984) (arguing that the police power doctrine 
has come to eviscerate the importance and utility of the Contract Clause). 
 127.  See, e.g., Williamson v. Lee Optical of Okla., Inc., 348 U.S. 483, 488–
91 (1955) (explaining the contemporary “rational basis” test).  See also 
Epstein, supra note 126, at 735–40. 
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construct a hypothetical where legislation would fall outside this 
broad classification of state power.  Courts have recognized even 
“broad and generalized economic or social problems” as 
permissible purposes for the execution of legislation under the 
doctrine of police power.128  As such, this hurdle is especially easy 
for a state to clear.  It is necessary for the judiciary to fully grasp 
the government’s intended public purpose to come to a proper 
conclusion under Prong III. 
Despite the historically low burden placed on states to justify 
legislation in other constitutional contexts, the independent 
importance of a legitimate public purpose in the context of a 
Contract Clause challenge to a public contract remains somewhat 
unclear.  Chief Justice Burger argued for heavier judicial scrutiny 
at this prong in his concurring opinion in United States Trust Co. 
of New York.129  There, Burger stated that in order for the law in 
question to avoid running afoul of the Contract Clause, “the state 
must demonstrate that the impairment was essential to the 
achievement of an important state purpose.”130  Justice Burger 
continued that, in his opinion, “the State must show that it did not 
know and could not have known the impact of the contract on that 
state interest at the time that the contract was made.”131  This 
specific deviation from general judicial deference to the police 
power doctrine at Prong II has not been expressly followed by 
courts, despite the impression that it logically comports with the 
principal that stricter judicial scrutiny should apply to both Prong 
II and III of the Contract Clause analysis. 
C.  Is the Modification of the Rights and Responsibilities of the 
Parties to the Contract “Reasonable and Necessary” in Light of the 
Public Purpose? 
If the government can meet the historically low burden of 
articulating a legitimate public purpose behind the impairment of 
a public contract, the court must then evaluate if the impairment 
of the contract is reasonable and necessary in light of the 
articulated public purpose.  It is important to note that the context 
 
 128.  U.S. Steel v. Spannaus, 438 U.S. 234, 250 (1978). 
 129.  431 U.S. 1, 32–33 (1977) (Burger, C.J., concurring). 
 130.  Id. at 32 (emphasis added).  
 131.  Id.  
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of the court’s determination of the reasonableness of a law’s means 
is related to the extent of the contractual impairment determined 
at Prong I of the analysis.132  For contracts with the state, a more 
demanding review is necessary at this level, because the state’s 
self-interest in surviving the Contract Clause challenge might 
cause its legislature to make legislative findings and judgments 
which are not objective, but prejudiced in favor of the state.133  
Thus, courts defer to the legislature to a lesser degree in order to 
account for the likelihood of the state’s underlying self-interest.134 
The federal District Courts of Washington have offered five 
factors to contextualize the inquiry into the reasonableness of a 
law’s means.  Under their test, courts should consider: 
(1) the emergency nature of the legislation; (2) whether 
the state had previously regulated the subject activity; (3) 
whether the impact is generalized or specifically directed 
toward a narrow class; (4) whether the reliance on pre-
existing rights was both actual and reasonable; and (5) 
whether the challenged law worked a severe, permanent, 
and immediate change in those relationships reasonably 
relied upon.135 
A judicial determination of “reasonableness” traditionally 
rests on the law itself.136  The reasonableness test, in the Contract 
Clause context, was described by Justice Blackmun in United 
States Trust Co. of New York as essentially “whether the reason 
for the impairment was foreseeable in light of the surrounding 
circumstances at the time the contract was made.”137  As noted 
above, the review does not reach formal heightened standards of 
review; the Supreme Court appears to have articulated a standard 
of reasonableness that assesses more than whether the law is 
 
 132.  See, e.g., Energy Reserves Grp., Inc. v. Kan. Power & Light Co., 459 
U.S. 400, 411–12 (1983).  
 133.  See, e.g., U.S. Trust Co. of N.Y., 431 U.S. at 26; Md. State Teachers 
Ass’n, Inc. v. Hughes, 594 F. Supp. 1353, 1360 (D. Md. 1984). 
 134.  See, e.g., RUI One Corp. v. City of Berkeley, 371 F.3d 1137, 1147 (9th 
Cir. 2004). 
 135.  Cycle Barn, Inc. v. Arctic Cat Sales Inc., 701 F. Supp. 2d 1197, 1203 
(W.D. Wash. 2010) (citing Chico’s Pizza Franchises, Inc. v. Sisemore, 544 F. 
Supp. 248, 249 (E.D. Wash. 1981)). 
 136.  See, e.g., McGarth v. R.I. Ret. Bd., 88 F.3d 12, 16 (1st Cir. 1996). 
 137.  Clarke, supra note 85, at 197 (citing U.S. Trust Co. of N.Y., 431 U.S. 
at 31–32). 
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rational but does not require intermediate or strict scrutiny.  The 
analysis is instead, as Justice Blackmun notes, analogous to 
questions raised by negligence law.  The fundamental question to 
be asked is whether the government’s chosen means, considering 
the circumstances of the law and the substantial impairments it 
places on contractual obligations, are ones that a reasonable 
individual would foresee at the creation of the contract. 
The question of whether the law is “necessary” in light of the 
public purpose invites the court to consider the existence of any 
less restrictive, viable alternatives that exist for the state.138  A 
state cannot not pass legislation substantially impairing its own 
contractual obligation without first pursuing other alternatives 
which might achieve a similar public purpose.139  Additionally, the 
court should look to severity of impairment and consider if a more 
moderate course of action might serve the purported public 
purposes equally well.140  The necessity element is a separate and 
independent analysis to the reasonableness inquiry.  A law cannot 
be either reasonable or necessary to survive challenge; the law’s 
means must be both reasonable and necessary. 
III. RIRSA AND THE CONTRACT CLAUSE 
This Section applies the substance and effect of RIRSA, 
discussed above in Section I, to the general legal framework of a 
publically impaired Contract Clause challenge, discussed in 
Section II.  This Section addresses each element of a Contract 
Clause analysis in order to fully explore the issues likely to arise. 
 
 138.  See id. (citing U.S. Trust Co. of N.Y., 431 U.S. at 29–30) (establishing 
that an impairment is “necessary” if the legislature’s purpose cannot be 
accomplished by impairment in a less drastic fashion and alternative means 
of achieving the legislature’s purpose without impairment are not available).  
See also, e.g., Univ. of Hawaii Prof’l Assemb. v. Cayetano, 183 F.3d 1096, 
1107 (9th Cir. 1999) (discussing that a contractual impairment may not be 
considered necessary, for Contract Clause purposes, if there is an alternative 
that would also serve the defendants ’ purpose, especially since the Contract 
Clause limits the state in curtailing its obligations unnecessarily); Balt. 
Teachers Union v. City Council of Balt., 6 F.3d 1012, 1020 (4th Cir. 1993) 
(stating that a court must consider whether a state is acting in self-interest 
in abridging contract obligations, and also whether more reasonable means 
exist, in order to decide whether the contract impairment violates the 
Contract Clause). 
 139.  See, e.g., Cayetano, 183 F. 3d at 1107. 
 140.  See, e.g., Balt. Teachers Union, 6 F.3d at 1020.  
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As of this writing, the current RIRSA litigation pending in the 
Rhode Island Superior Court is awaiting a final settlement 
order.141  Notwithstanding any forthcoming resolution of that 
particular dispute, the underlying issues with RIRSA’s 
constitutionality remain salient.  This Comment explores the legal 
theory underpinning a challenge to RIRSA under the Contract 
Clause of the Rhode Island Constitution.  A proper application of 
the Contract Clause to RIRSA will result in the law’s invalidation.  
RIRSA substantially impairs a public contract by means that are 
not reasonable and appropriate to secure the interests it asserts.  
Although the law serves a legitimate governmental interest in 
balancing the state’s budgetary liabilities, that financial burden 
alone is insufficient for the law to survive a Contract Clause 
challenge.  Each element is addressed in turn below. 
A.  Is There A Substantial Impairment of a Public Contract? 
The first element of a Contract Clause challenge is assessing 
whether there is a substantial impairment of a contract by the 
legislation in question.  This involves answering a necessary 
predicate question: is there, in fact, a contract between the parties 
(here, the state and its public-sector employees)?  Once this 
threshold question has been answered, the inquiry turns to 
addressing whether the contract is substantially impaired.  This 
question has been litigated by the parties; however, this Comment 
argues that, independent of the reasoning of the superior court, 
RIRSA substantially impairs a contract between the State of 
Rhode Island and its workforce. 
i.  Whether There is, in fact, a Contractual Relationship Between 
Rhode Island and Members of the Public Pension Systems 
As discussed in Section II.A.i above, the initial hurdle for 
plaintiffs bringing a Contract Clause challenge is significantly 
higher in cases where the alleged contract at issue is with the 
state.142  To clear this hurdle, the plaintiffs must first establish 
that a contract exists between themselves and the State of Rhode 
Island.  While only a preliminary step in the greater scheme of 
 
 141.  See Gregg, supra note 76. 
 142.  See discussion supra Part II.A.  See also Parella v. Ret. Bd. of R.I. 
Emps. Ret. Sys., 173 F.3d 46, 60 (1st Cir. 1999).  
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clearing Prong I of a Contract Clause challenge for plaintiffs, it is 
nevertheless a step of dire importance and difficulty.143 
The existence of a contractual relationship was the only issue 
addressed by the Rhode Island Superior Court in its constitutional 
evaluation of RIRSA.144  Thus, this subsection will focus primarily 
on the plaintiffs’ and government’s arguments articulated at this 
stage.  After a summary of the arguments and the opinion of the 
court, the remainder of the analysis will depart from describing 
the specific facts of the ongoing challenge to RIRSA and will apply 
the test of the Contract Clause to RIRSA directly. 
A sub-class of plaintiffs145 with more than ten years of service 
under their proverbial belt received an encouraging sign in April 
of 2014 when the Associate Justice of the Rhode Island Superior 
Court presiding over the case, Judge Sarah Taft-Carter, rejected a 
motion to dismiss brought by the State.146  Judge Taft-Carter 
recognized a unilateral, implied-in-fact contract between the 
employees with ten or more years of service and the State of 
Rhode Island.147 
In its consolidated motion to dismiss, the State leaned heavily 
on the unmistakability doctrine to support the claim that there 
was no statutory language to support the plaintiffs’ initial burden 
of establishing a contract with the state.148  Judge Taft-Carter 
recognized that, although Rhode Island has yet to expressly adopt 
the unmistakability doctrine, the Rhode Island Supreme Court 
adopted its foundational reasoning in Brennan v. Kirby.149  While 
 
 143.  See, e.g., Justus v. State, 336 P.3d 202, 208–09 (Colo. 2014). 
 144.  See Bristol/Warren Reg’l Sch. Emps. v. Chafee, No. PC 12-3168, 2014 
WL 1743142, at * 15 (R.I. Super. Ct. Apr. 25, 2014). 
 145.  See id. at *1 n.1; see also R.I. GEN. LAWS § 36-10-1 (2011); R.I. GEN. 
LAWS § 16-16-22 (2013); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 45-21-41 (2009). 
 146.  Bristol/Warren Reg’l Sch. Emps., 2014 WL 1743142, at *2. 
 147.  Id. at *14.  Judge Taft-Carter went on to clarify that this was only a 
preliminary step in finding merit in the plaintiffs ’ constitutional claims 
against the government and elaborated that the court had not made a final 
ruling with respect to the State’s ability to unilaterally alter the pension 
statute with respect to the sub-set of plaintiff-employees who have not yet 
fully retired.  Id. 
 148.  Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs ’ Complaint at 7–9, R.I. Pub. 
Emps.’ Ret. Coal., v. Chafee, No. PC123166, 2014 WL 1577496 (R.I. Super. 
Ct. Apr. 16, 2014), 2012 WL 5520089.  
 149.  Bristol/Warren Reg’l Sch. Emps., 2014 WL 1743142, at *6–7 (“[O]ur 
Supreme Court stated that, absent a clear indication by the Legislature that 
it intended to bind itself contractually by passing an enactment, the 
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she acknowledged that Rhode Island does not expressly state that 
pension benefits are contractual in nature, she also brought 
attention to Rhode Island General Laws section 36-10-7, entitled 
“Guaranty by state—Annual appropriations.”150  Section 36-10-7 
provides, inter alia, that “it is the intention of the state to make 
payment of the annuities, benefits, and retirement allowances 
provided for under the provisions of this chapter.”151  Further, the 
court stated that “the language [of § 36-10-7] provides some 
evidence that the State promised to provide some pension benefits, 
§ 36-10-7 does not promise any particular amount of pension 
benefits, nor does it indicate that the benefit levels may not be 
changed or altered.”152  In her analysis of the language of section 
36-10-7, Judge Taft-Carter relied heavily upon the First Circuit’s 
reasoning in National Education Ass’n-R.I. ex rel. Scigulinsky v. 
Retirement Board of Rhode Island Employees’ Retirement 
System.153  There, the court concluded that the language of section 
36-10-7 “falls at least a step short of clearly expressing a 
contractual commitment not to change benefit levels or other plan 
variables by legislation” and, therefore, fails to meet the clear and 
unequivocal standard of the federal unmistakability doctrine.154  
Thus, Judge Taft-Carter ultimately concluded that the isolated 
text of section 36-10-7 is ambiguous for the purposes of finding 
that the legislature intended to be bound contractually to the 
 
presumption pervades that [the] law is not intended to create private 
contractual or vested rights but merely declares a policy to be pursed until 
the legislature shall ordain otherwise.” (quoting Brennan v. Kirby, 529 A.2d 
633, 638 (R.I. 1887)) (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
 150.  Id. at *7; R.I GEN. LAWS § 36-10-7 (2011) (providing language that 
arguably evinces the Rhode Island legislatures intent to be contractually 
bound to the full payment of pension benefits to members of the public 
retirement benefit system).  Compare MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 32, § 25(5) (2009), 
with R.I. GEN. LAWS § 36-10-1 (2011) (contrasting the express statutory 
language of a Massachusetts statute establishing contractual pension 
benefits with the absence of such language in Rhode Island laws defining the 
public pension system).  
 151.  R.I. GEN. LAWS § 36-10-7. 
 152.  Bristol/Warren Reg’l Sch. Emps., 2014 WL 1743142, at *8. 
 153.  Id. (citing Nat’l Educ. Ass’n-R.I. ex rel. Scigulinsky v. Ret. Bd. of R.I. 
Emps.’ Ret. Sys., 172 F.3d 22, 28–29 (1st Cir. 1999)). 
 154.  Scigulinsky, 172 F.3d at 28; see also Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp. v. 
Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. Co., 470 U.S. 451, 465–66 (1985) 
(articulating the need for the language of legislation to clearly and 
unequivocally indicate legislative intent to be bound by contract for the 
purposes of the unmistakability doctrine). 
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payment of public pension benefits.155 
Finding ambiguity in the contractual nature of the pure 
language of section 36-10-7, Judge Taft-Carter went on to clarify 
that the statute may be interpreted as a contract in cases where 
the legislative intent to be bound is established and supported by 
language of the statute and the surrounding circumstances.156  
Accordingly, she turned to a brief analysis of the legislative 
history of section 36-10-7.157  She acknowledged that the General 
Assembly expressly reversed the right to amend, alter, or repeal 
provisions of the Municipal Employment Retirement System 
(“MERS”).158  Thus, it appears that the General Assembly had an 
opportunity to implement a similar provision for the ERSRI but 
did not elect to do so.159  However, Judge Taft-Carter declined to 
“construe the absence of such a provision as evidence of an 
unmistakable intent to be contractually bound” and concluded 
that “[§ 36-10-7] remains ambiguous as to the existence of a 
contractual relationship between Plaintiffs and the State.”160 
Failing to find any conclusive evidence of legislative 
contractual intent from the legislative history, Judge Taft-Carter 
ultimately turned to foundational principles of contract law—
namely offer and acceptance—in reaching her conclusion.161  In so 
doing, she was careful to distinguish the State as an employer 
contracting with employees as opposed to a sovereign dealing with 
private citizens.162  Thus, the existence of an employer-employee 
relationship between the state and its employees weighs in favor 
of finding an implied contract.163  She found that the government 
had made an offer by inducing the employees to enter into a 
 
 155.  Bristol/Warren Reg’l Sch. Emps., 2014 WL 1743142, at *8.  
 156.  Id. at *9; see also U.S. Trust Co. of N.Y. v. New Jersey, 431 U.S. 1, 17 
n.14 (1977); Retired Adjunct Professors of R.I. v. Almond, 690 A.2d 1242, 
1346 (R.I. 1997).  
 157.  Bristol/Warren Reg’l Sch. Emps., 2014 WL 1743142, at *7. 
 158.  Id. at *2; see also R.I. GEN. LAWS § 45-21-47 (2009). 
 159.  Bristol/Warren Reg’l Sch. Emps., 2014 WL 1743142, at *8. 
 160.  Id. 
 161.  Id. at *12. 
 162.  Id. at *11. 
 163.  Id. at *16–17; see also Nat’l Educ. Ass’n-R.I. ex rel. Scigulinsky v. 
Ret. Bd. of R.I. Emps.’ Ret. Sys., 172 F.3d 22, 28–29 (1st Cir. 1999).  See also 
McGrath v. R.I. Ret. Bd., 88 F.3d 12, 17 (1st Cir. 1996) (“[A] pension plan 
represents an implied-in-fact unilateral contract [in the context of both] state 
and municipal pension plans.”).   
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bargain by dangling the incentive of a pension payment.164  The 
State offered these pension benefits in exchange for “continued 
and faithful service” to the State and pension system.165  She 
concluded that “[w]ith respect to unilateral contracts, an offeree 
may accept an offer by beginning to perform.”166  Therefore, the 
plaintiffs accepted the State’s offer by beginning their 
employment, contributing to the mandatory pension system, and, 
for the purposes of this sub-class of plaintiffs, continued their 
service for the required time (ten years) in order for the pension 
benefits to become vested as prescribed by the governing pension 
statute.167 
Judge Taft-Carter’s holding, while favorable for challengers to 
RIRSA, must be taken with a procedural grain of salt.  This 
decision was in response to a pre-trial motion to dismiss filed by 
the State and, thus, is to be viewed through the prism of Rhode 
Island’s liberal pleading standards.  Accordingly, the court “[did] 
not deal with the likelihood of success [of the plaintiffs Contract 
Clause challenge] on the merits, but rather with the viability of 
[the] plaintiff’s bare-bones allegations and claims as they are set 
forth in the complaint.”168  Therefore, in finding a unilateral, 
implied-in-fact contract between the State and the plaintiffs, 
Judge Taft-Carter must have “assume[d] that the allegations 
contained in the complaint [were] true, and examine[d] the facts 
in light most favorable to the nonmoving party”—in this case, the 
challengers to the legislation.169 
This decision establishes the importance of “vesting” in the 
impending analysis.  Judge Taft-Carter recognized that there is 
 
 164.  Bristol/Warren Reg’l Sch. Emps., 2014 WL 1743142, at *11–12. 
 165.  Id. at *12; see also R.I. GEN. LAWS § 36-10.1-1 (2011) (“Rhode Island 
Public Employee Pension Revocation and Reduction Act”). 
 166.  Bristol/Warren Reg’l Sch. Emps., 2014 WL 1743142, at *12 (citing 
WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS § 6:26 (4th ed. 2010)). 
 167.  See id. See also “Vested” in Glossary of Terms, EMPS.’ RET. SYS. OF 
R.I., http://content.ersri.org/glossary-of-terms/#gsc.tab=0 (last visited Mar. 
22, 2015) (“You must have 10 years of contributing service credit to be vested 
in ERSRI.  Once you are vested, you are eligible to collect a retirement 
benefit when you reach retirement age.”). 
 168.  Bristol/Warren Reg’l Sch. Emps., 2014 WL 1743142, at *4 (quoting 
Hyatt v. Vill. House Convalescent Home, Inc., 880 A.2d 821, 823 (R.I. 2005))  
(internal quotation marks omitted). 
 169.  Id. (quoting Boyer v. Bedrosian, 57 A.3d 259, 270 (R.I. 2012)) 
(internal quotation marks omitted). 
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significant disagreement in Rhode Island case law over exactly 
when pension benefits vest for the purposes of establishing a 
legally cogent contract.170  The initial determination of the 
existence of a contractual relationship becomes somewhat 
convoluted in cases of public pension reform because of 
inconsistent interpretation of vested pension benefits throughout 
the states.  The question of when exactly a contractual provision 
vests in an employee is a highly complex issue that can frustrate 
an entire Contract Clause analysis.  For example, if a court 
concludes that the benefit has not yet vested in the employee, then 
there is, of course, no contractual relationship to impede through 
legislation.  Some states have taken a very liberal approach to this 
issue and have concluded that a public employee’s benefits vest at 
the beginning of their employment.171  Thus, if a state legislature 
substantially changes a retirement benefit system on a public 
employee’s first day on the job, she presumably has a contractual 
right to that benefit for the purposes of a Contract Clause 
analysis.172  On the other end of the spectrum, some states have 
held that pension rights only become contractually vested at the 
time of retirement or eligibility for retirement.173  Some states 
 
 170.  Id. at *10.  Cf. Buck, supra note 6, at 20 (describing vested rights 
interchangeably with contractual rights).  But see Nat’l Educ. Ass’n-R.I. ex 
rel. Scigulinsky v. Ret. Bd. of R.I. Emps.’ Ret. Sys., 172 F.3d 22, 26 (1st Cir. 
1999) (“‘Vesting’ and ‘contractual’ are not synonymous.”).   
 171.  See Buck, supra note 6, at 54.  The California Supreme Court has 
held that “[a] public employee’s pension constitutes an element of 
compensation, and a vested contractual right to pension benefits accrues 
upon acceptance of employment.  Such a pension right may not be destroyed, 
once vested, without impairing a contractual obligation of the employing 
public entity.”  Betts v. Bd. of Admin. of Pub. Emps. Ret. Sys., 582 P.2d 614, 
617 (Cal. 1978). 
 172.  See Buck, supra note 6, at 54.  Although whether this contract is 
substantially impaired is apparently a different question entirely.  The 
Oregon Supreme Court held that “[a]n employee’s contract right to pension 
benefits becomes vested at the time of his or her acceptance of employment.  
On vesting, an employee’s contractual interest in a pension plan may not be 
substantially impaired by subsequent legislation.”  Hughes v. Oregon, 838 
P.2d 1018, 1029 (Ore. 1992) (citations omitted). 
 173.  See Buck, supra note 6, at 55.  The Nevada Supreme Court held:  
Until an employee has earned his retirement pay, or until the time 
arrives when he may retire, his retirement pay is but an inchoate 
right; but when the conditions are satisfied, at that time retirement 
pay becomes a vested right of which the person entitled thereto 
cannot be deprived; it has ripened into a full contractual obligation.   
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have taken a more dynamic approach to this question and have 
concluded that pension rights become contractual at some point 
later than the beginning of employment, although the exact period 
is usually undefined.174 
Rhode Island public pension benefits appear to vest in 
employees who have contributed at least ten years of faithful and 
honorable service.175  Thus, any public employee who has 
“contributed money [to the Public Employment systems] that, in 
addition to their continued service, was given in exchange for the 
State’s promise to provide pension benefits” has established an 
implied-in-fact contract with the State of Rhode Island.176  This 
conclusion, of course, does little for any employee who has not met 
the ten-year threshold.  However, “[the Rhode Island] Supreme 
Court appears to have accepted that pension rights become 
enforceable as contracts once an employee has fulfilled the 
statutory requirements, if not before.”177  The Rhode Island 
Supreme Court has “specifically acknowledged that ‘[c]ontract 
rights may attach upon entering public employment and 
service.’”178 
In sum, it seems clear that retired employees, as well as 
employees with at least ten years of honorable service and 
 
Nicholas v. Nevada, 992 P.2d 262, 264 (Nev. 2000) (quoting Police Pension & 
Relief Bd. of Denver v. McPhail, 338 P.2d 694, 700 (Colo. 1959)). 
 174.  Buck, supra note 6, at 54–55.  The Tennessee Supreme Court stated 
that “we are not convinced that a [pension] plan is ‘frozen’ against 
detrimental changes or modifications the moment an employee begins to 
participate in it, where such changes are necessary to preserve the fiscal and 
actuarial integrity of the plan as a whole.”  Blackwell v. Quarterly Cnty. Ct. 
of Shelby Cnty., 622 S.W.2d 535, 541 (Tenn. 1981).  However, the Kansas 
Supreme Court stated that public employees have a contractual right in the 
state pension system after “[c]ontinued employment over a reasonable period 
of time during which substantial services are furnished to the employer, plan 
membership is maintained, and regular contributions to the fund are made.”  
Singer v. City of Topeka, 607 P.2d 467, 474 (Kan. 1980). 
 175.  See R.I. GEN. LAWS § 36-10-9 (2011) (providing that, inter alia, the 
statutory requirement for state employees is ten years of contributory 
service); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 16-16-12 (providing that, inter alia, the statutory 
requirement for teachers is ten years of contributory service).  
 176.  Bristol/Warren Reg’l Sch. Emps. v. Chafee, No. PC 12-3168, 2014 WL 
1743142, at *13–14 (R.I. Super. Ct. Apr. 25, 2014). 
 177.  Id. at *13 (emphasis added) (citing In re Almeida, 611 A.2d 1375, 
1385–86 (R.I. 1992)). 
 178.  Id. at *19 (emphasis added) (quoting In re Almedia, 611 A.2d at 
1385). 
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contribution to ERISA, have a contractual relationship with the 
State of Rhode Island.  Although apparently not at issue in the 
RIRSA litigation,179 the Rhode Island Supreme Court has left 
open the possible existence of a contractual relationship between 
non-vested, public employees and the State of Rhode Island.180  
The scope of these relationships is variable depending on the 
employment status of the plaintiff, but, for the purposes of a 
Contract Clause challenge, it appears that most, if not all, state 
employees have a contractual relationship with the State of Rhode 
Island.  At the very least, RIRSA impairs contractual 
relationships that have already been created, and it was designed 
to do precisely that.  Because the fundamental purpose of RIRSA 
is to redefine preexisting contractual relationships with employees 
whose pension plans have already vested, at least some plaintiffs 
can challenge the law. 
ii. Does RIRSA Impair the Contractual Relationship Between the 
Public Employees and the State of Rhode Island? 
Recall that, for the purposes of a Contract Clause challenge, 
courts have considered an “impairment” to be a mere alteration to 
the contractual relationship.181  According to noted public pension 
reform commentator Amy B. Monahan, case law indicates that it 
is relatively easy for a challenger to establish a contractual 
 
 179.  Id. at *19 (“Because the instant case involves Plaintiffs who have 
already vested, it is not necessary for the Court to decide what, if any, 
contractual rights may attach before vesting. For the purposes of this case, 
Plaintiffs are all vested employees who have fulfilled the statutory 
requirements.”). 
 180.  See In re Almedia, 611 A.2d at 1385, 1386.  But see Retired Adjunct 
Professors of R.I. v. Almond, 690 A.2d 1342, 1345, 1346 (R.I. 1997).  In 
Almond, the Rhode Island Supreme Court explored the notion that reliance 
interest alone should not determine the contractual nature of a legislative 
enactment as it would greatly limit the amount of permissible statutory 
changes to pension-benefit schemes.  Id.  However, commentators have 
dissented on the judiciary’s ubiquitous majoritarian policy concern for the 
possibility of state legislatures being tethered to past “contracts,” thus 
rendering them politically inflexible with their sovereign powers in the 
future.  See, e.g., Epstein, supra note 126, at 709, 717, 718, 719, 732, 735, 738. 
 181.  See, e.g., McGrath v. R.I. Ret. Bd., By and Through Mayer, 906 F. 
Supp. 749, 764 (D.R.I. 1995) (“The question of whether the contract was 
impaired has already been answered in the affirmative . . . The more 
nettlesome question is whether that deprivation amounted to a substantial 
impairment.”).  See also discussion supra Part II.A.ii.   
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impairment in the realm of public pension law.182  “[M]any 
legislative changes to public pension plans are found to be 
impairments [including] benefit formula changes, . . . changes in 
funding sources or methodology[,] state action eliminating [COLA] 
supplemental payments[, and] offsetting pension benefits by the 
amount of workers’ compensation benefits received.”183 
As noted above, RIRSA imposes three major substantive 
changes to the public pension benefit system: (i) changing the 
retirement benefit system from a pure defined contribution system 
to a “hybrid” system, (ii) the suspension and permanent reduction 
of COLAs, and (iii) the increased retirement age.  Taking into 
account Monahan’s framework, it is clear that all three of these 
legislative changes constitute an “impairment” for the purposes of 
this analysis.184  However, a mere impairment of a contractual 
relationship or obligation is not enough to satisfy Prong I of the 
Contract Clause analysis.  The challenger must further establish 
that this impairment is of requisite substantiality to justify 
further judicial review of state legislative interference with a 
public contract. 
iii.  Is the Contractual Impairment Imposed by RIRSA of Requisite 
Substantiality to Justify Further Analysis? 
The contractual rights and relationships established between 
the State of Rhode Island and the members of the public 
retirement system have been substantially impaired by the 
alterations of RIRSA.  Recall that many Contract Clause 
challenges to alleged impairments of public contracts falter at this 
stage; however, none of the legislation previously evaluated 
contains the degree of sweeping and severe legislative alteration 
as does RIRSA.  No state employee could have reasonably 
expected that the State would attempt to warp the public 
employment benefit system in such a drastic way.  RIRSA is more 
than mere commonplace regulation of a pension system; it is an 
unprecedented and drastic economic measure taken with the 
expressly stated purpose of avoiding state financial insolvency.  
However, at this stage of the Contract Clause analysis, the 
 
 182.  MONAHAN, supra note 17, at 15. 
 183.  Id.  
 184.  See id.  
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purpose and potential justification for the impairment is 
immaterial.  It is sufficient at this stage to accept that the 
impairment of the contractual relationship and rights flowing 
from that relationship between state employees and the Rhode 
Island government are surely substantial enough to reach further 
inquiry. 
The first two elements of RIRSA’s pension-reform framework, 
the benefit reduction and change to a defined contribution plan 
and the COLA reductions—by themselves—substantially impair 
the contractual relationship between the State and its employees.  
The shift from a pure defined benefit retirement system to a 
hybrid system is the most drastic measure.185  This element of 
RIRSA dramatically warped the very structure of the public 
employee benefit system such that it is almost beyond recognition.  
While Rhode Island’s old retirement system was not especially 
generous to retirees, the new system imposed by RIRSA 
represents not just a reasonably expected erosion of those benefits, 
but a palpable corruption of the expectation interests and 
idiosyncratic retirement plans of contributing public employees.186 
RIRSA changes the accrual rate under the residual defined 
benefit plan from a guaranteed benefit based on calculable factors, 
to one percent of the final average salary per year of service.187  
Additionally, under RIRSA, five percent of the employee’s salary—
more than half of their total contribution—is automatically 
deposited into a mandatory defined contribution account.188  The 
formulaic changes from a defined contribution plan to a hybrid 
plan, articulated in Section 7 of RIRSA, impose on the average 
thirty-year worker “an average benefits cut of 14 percent.”189  
While this number is a significant decrease of guaranteed benefits 
in and of itself, it has the potential to become even more 
substantial after one considers the market risks to which the 
employee is exposed to as a result of RIRSA’s defined contribution 
 
 185.  See discussion supra Part I.A.  See also 2011 R.I. Pub. Laws 408, § 7. 
 186.  See discussion supra Part I.A.  See also 2011 R.I. Pub. Laws 408, § 7.  
See also HILTONSMITH, supra, note 21, at 2; MORRISSEY, supra note 22, at 4.  
 187.  See discussion supra Part I.A.; 2011 R.I. Pub. Laws 408, § 7.  See also 
HILTONSMITH, supra, note 21, at 3. 
 188.  HILTONSMITH, supra, note 21, at 3. 
 189.  Id. at 2. 
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system.190 
Beyond the raw mathematical impairment imposed by 
RIRSA, the shift from a defined benefit plan to a hybrid plan is 
such a unique disruption of the status quo that it ultimately must 
impact the employee’s expectations.  A fundamental purpose of 
the public pension system is to induce skilled workers away from 
the private-sector with the promise of a lucrative pension.191  In 
Rhode Island, this pension was always structured, until RIRSA, as 
a traditional defined benefit system.192  As discussed above in 
Section I.A, defined benefit plans are desirable to employees 
because they are relatively calculable based on a variety of factors 
that are largely in control of the employee herself.193  Surely, a 
number of public employees had at least partially planned for 
their financial future around the concrete and comparatively 
predictable benefit estimates under a defined benefit plan.  By 
dismantling the existing defined benefit system and sewing a 
debased version of it back together with variable accrual formulas 
and the unpredictable presence of market risk inherent in defined 
contribution systems, RIRSA frustrates the public employees’ 
expected benefit of the bargain, not merely by reducing the actual 
benefits, but by eviscerating future financial plans formulated in 
reliance on the old pension system. 
RIRSA’s manipulation of COLA benefits is also an 
independent ground for finding a substantial impairment of the 
contractual relationship between the government and the state 
employees.  The COLA reform element of RIRSA suspends COLA 
benefits until the pension system is eighty percent funded and 
permanently reduces the COLA formula once that threshold is 
eventually reached.194  This applies to not only future and current 
 
 190.  See id. (forecasting “[f]or the quarter of future employees who are in 
the lowest quartile of investment returns on their [defined contribution] plan” 
an average cut of “22 percent or higher”); MORRISSEY, supra note 22, at 3. 
 191.  See, e.g., Kern v. Long Beach, 179 P.2d 799, 803 (Cal. 1947); Cloutier 
v. State, 42 A.3d 816, 823 (N.H. 2012); James B. Jacobs et al., Pension 
Forfeiture: A Problematic Sanction for Public Corruption, 35 AM. CRIM. L. 
REV. 57, 81 (1997). 
 192.  See HILTONSMITH, supra note 21, at 2; MORRISSEY, supra note 22, at 
1. 
 193.  See HILTONSMITH, supra note 21, at 2; RANDAZZO, supra note 13, at 
18–19. 
 194.  See discussion supra Part I.B (discussing COLA reform). 
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state employees, but also impairs the benefits of retirees as well.  
Retirees do not just have vested contractual rights in their 
retirement benefits, but have fully completed their end of the 
contractual relationship.  Because retirees will presumably regain 
their reduced COLA benefits once the pension system is eighty 
percent funded, RIRSA appears to stop short of permanently 
revoking COLA benefits for retirees.  Given the expectation that it 
will take approximately sixteen years to reach the eighty percent 
threshold, this minimal concession for retirees is largely 
illusory.195  If these estimations are correct, retirees will have 
much less time to enjoy the benefit of COLA payments, as this 
annuity traditionally extinguishes at the death of the retiree and 
surviving spouse.196  Thus, the government appears to be running 
out the proverbial clock on their obligations by suspending these 
benefits until such a lofty goal of financial stability is achieved.  
This is not just a delay in the provision of benefits.  The stakes are 
quite clear: either the retirees will have COLAs in the relatively 
limited period before their deaths, or they will not.  RIRSA stands 
for the latter position. 
Moreover, a fully vested retiree who has contributed a full 
career’s worth of honorable service could, and should, not expect to 
have their financial stability completely altered in retirement.  
While some other options exist for retirees to maintain financial 
stability in their post-work life, such as Individual Retirement 
Accounts (“IRAs”), the retirees affected by RIRSA have not had 
the benefit of foresight to plan for such an unprecedented 
suspension of benefit.  Retirees are generally too old to reenter the 
workplace and supplant their benefits with additional income.  
Therefore, unless the retiree has exhibited a paranoid level of 
economic prudence, taking into account the possibility of a portion 
of her retirement benefit completely drying up for an 
indeterminate period of time, it is obvious that the retiree has had 
 
 195.  See Bristol/Warren Reg’l Sch. Emps. v. Chafee, No. PC 12-3168, 2014 
WL 1743142, at *6 (R.I. Super. Ct. Apr. 25, 2014). 
 196.  R.I. GEN. LAWS § 28-30-17 (Supp. 2014) (“[A judge’s] surviving spouse 
shall receive annually thereafter during his or her lifetime and so long as he 
or she remains unmarried, an amount equal to one-half (1/2) of the annual 
payment that the judge was receiving by way of salary or retirement pay at 
the time of his or her death.”); R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 28-30-18, 36-10-18 to -19.1 
(Supp. 2014).  See also R.I. GEN. LAWS § 36-10-35 (Supp. 2014) (providing the 
statutory structure of COLA benefits before RIRSA). 
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her contractual right substantially impaired. The mere possibility 
that one retiree had her financial security and stability shaken by 
the COLA suspension is sufficient to render RIRSA a substantial 
impairment of the contractual relationship between the State and 
the state employees. 
Additionally, current vested employees likewise have an 
argument that the COLA suspension and permanent reduction, 
taken in isolation, are sufficient to constitute a substantial 
impairment for the purposes of a Contract Clause challenge.  As 
already noted above, a principal purpose of a public pension 
system is to lure skilled employees away from the private sector 
by using a lucrative public pension as inducement.197  A key 
element of the public pension benefit system is COLAs.  As 
discussed above in Section I.B, COLAs operate as a supplemental 
source of income for retirees to help cope with the costs of living 
following retirement.  A permanent reduction of these benefits 
represents a substantial step backward from the premise that 
COLAs are intended to operate in step with increasing inflation 
costs, thus rendering the COLA, and the public pension benefit 
system by proxy, substantially less lucrative than when the public 
employee originally joined the workforce. 
The increase in retirement age, standing alone, does not have 
as substantial of an effect as the shift to a hybrid plan and the 
COLA reductions.  It does, when taken in context with the other 
two changes, however, work to substantially impair a state 
employee’s contractual relationship with the State. Depending on 
the age of the employee, an increased retirement age can have a 
significant impact on the future retirement expectations of the 
employee. This requires the employee to contribute additional 
years to the pension system—while also being that much older, 
and thus closer to extinguishment of pension payouts from the 
State. Additionally, this impacts the expectations and future plans 
of the employee, especially if the employee in question is older and 
closer to retirement.198  Although this is certainly an impairment 
of a contractual relationship, it does not appear to be of the 
requisite substantiality to invoke the heightened judicial review of 
 
 197.  See, e.g., Kern v. City of Long Beach, 179 P.2d 799, 803 (Cal. 1947); 
Cloutier v. State, 42 A.3d 816, 823 (N.H. 2011); Jacobs et al., supra note 191, 
at 81. 
 198.  See Buck, supra note 6, at 77. 
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a public contract for the purposes of a Contract Clause analysis.199  
However, when taken in conjunction with the aggregate effect of 
the other two independently substantial impairments imposed by 
RIRSA, it is clear that the overall effect of RIRSA substantially 
impairs the pension contracts between public employees and the 
State.  One independent substantial impairment would be 
sufficient, but RIRSA imposes two and adds a third significant 
factor that exacerbates the harms caused by the other two. 
While it is apparent that the government is permitted to 
make reasonable and insubstantial modifications to contractual 
relationships, RIRSA and the various contractual impairments 
that flow from it greatly exceed the level of traditional and 
reasonable modification.200  For example, in Retired Adjunct 
Professors of the State of Rhode Island v. Almond, the Supreme 
Court of Rhode Island initially failed to find a contractual 
relationship between the parties, but it went on to note that, even 
if there was a contractual relationship, it was not substantial 
enough to warrant further review under the Contract Clause.201  
There, the plaintiffs challenged a state statute under the Contract 
Clause that, in effect, imposed a $10,000 cap on the annual 
earnings of retired public employees that reentered the workplace 
after retirement.202  On the substantiality element, the court 
reasoned that “it is not even clear as a factual matter that the new 
$10,000 cap on reemployment earnings will actually have an 
adverse (let alone substantially adverse) impact on all of these 
plaintiffs’ previous earnings under the [previous reemployment 
scheme].”203  Here, the aggregate effect of increased investment 
risk in a compulsory hybrid system, the suspension of benefits for 
an indeterminate amount of time, the permanent reduction of 
some benefits, and an increased retirement age clearly leaves 
little doubt as to whether RIRSA will have an adverse impact on 
public employees. 
The court in Retired Adjunct Professors also reasoned that the 
 
 199.  See, e.g., Pineman v. Oechslin, 637 F.2d 601, 603 (2d Cir. 1981) 
(ultimately not addressing the issue on abstention grounds).   
 200.  See, e.g., McGrath v. R.I. Ret. Bd., By and Through Mayer, 906 F. 
Supp. 749, 764 (D.R.I. 1995). 
 201.  690 A.2d 1342, 1345–48 (R.I. 1997). 
 202.  Id. at 1344, 1347. 
 203.  Id. at 1347.  
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alleged impairment was not substantial because “[p]ublic pensions 
have always been a heavily regulated legal arena.  Therefore, 
individual expectations of immunity from future statutory change 
would have been unwarranted.”204  Unlike the plaintiffs in Retired 
Adjunct Professors, the challengers to RIRSA encompass a diverse 
breadth of state employees.  Therefore, this is not a case of 
individual expectations of immunity among sub-classifications of 
employees, but rather, this is a collective challenge to burdensome 
elements of RIRSA that echo through multiple chapters of Rhode 
Island civil law. 
Although courts, including the Rhode Island Supreme Court 
in Retired Adjunct Professors,205 have considered previous 
government regulation of the industry as indicia that evinces a 
lack of “substantial” impairment in Contract Clause challenges, 
this is by no means a determinative finding.  In Retired Adjunct 
Professors, the court addressed the regulation of reemployment 
benefits that, while facially similar to retirement benefits and 
COLAs, are more similar to health benefits.206  Unlike health 
benefits and reemployment benefits, which are subject to the 
“vagaries of labor negotiations,”207 Rhode Island General Laws 
section 36-11-12 provides that “[a]ny and all matters relating to 
the employees’ retirement system of the state of Rhode Island are 
excluded as negotiable items in the collective bargaining 
process.”208  Therefore, it would be misguided to attach strong 
persuasive weight to the “substantial impairment” element of the 
Retired Adjunct Professors analysis because that court confronted 
a very distinguishable aspect of related facts.209 
However, even if one is to accept the general premise that 
 
 204.  Id. at 1347; accord McGrath, 906 F. Supp. at 764.  
 205.  See, e.g., Retired Adjunct Professors, 690 A.2d at 1347; Nat ’l Educ. 
Ass’n-Rhode Island v. Ret. Bd. of R.I. Emps.’ Ret. Sys., 890 F. Supp. 1143, 
1163–64 (D.R.I. 1997) (opining that the challenged statute substantially 
impaired a contractual relationship despite the fact that the contractual 
relationship involved the highly regulated industry of public pensions). 
 206.  Retired Adjunct Professors, 690 A.2d at 1343.  
 207.  R.I. Council 94 v. Carcieri, No. PC 10-2859, 2011 WL 4198506, at *30 
(R.I. Super. Ct. Sept. 13, 2011) (quoting Uricoli v. Bd. of Trs., Police & 
Firemen’s Ret. Sys., 449 A.2d 1267, 1273 (N.J. 1982)) (internal quotation 
marks omitted) (adopting a portion of the analysis implemented in Uricoli). 
 208.  R.I. GEN. LAWS § 36-11-12 (2011).  See also Carcieri, 2011 WL 
4198506, at *30. 
 209.  See 690 A.2d at 1347. 
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public pensions are subject to substantial statutory modification 
and therefore more difficult for challengers to establish a 
substantial impairment,210 the massive and unendurable burden 
imposed by RIRSA upon such an widespread group of current and 
retired public-sector employees in Rhode Island is nonetheless 
sufficiently unreasonable to establish a substantial impairment 
and, at a minimum, justify further review.211  The bottom line is 
that RIRSA represents a remarkably broad and unprecedented 
attempt at public pension reform with alarmingly ambitious goals 
and very real hardships for members of the public employment 
system as a result.  Commentators are generally compelled to 
remark on the radical nature and broad reformatory stroke of 
RIRSA regardless of whether they are criticizing or applauding 
the legislation.212  Because of the expansive nature of RIRSA, any 
argument flowing from the premise that public pension systems 
are traditionally regulated and, therefore, impairments are not 
requisitely substantial, must fail. No public employee could 
reasonably be assumed to have considered the risk of a wholesale 
government rebuild of the public pension system that 
substantially reduces contractual rights at multiple junctures.  
The presumed underpinning of this premise is that public 
employees should expect some reasonable modification in their 
field; however, RIRSA is far from reasonable.  Even if one 
disagrees with the notion that RIRSA is patently unreasonable, 
further evaluation at Prongs II and III of the Contract Clause test 
are then at least necessary. 
In sum, individual elements of RIRSA standing alone severely 
impact the contractual rights established between the government 
and vested state employees, including retirees.213  RIRSA does not 
 
 210.  See id. 
 211.  See MORRISSEY, supra note 22, at 7–8.  
 212.  Compare Von Drehle, supra note 10, at 32, 36 (commenting on the 
ambitiousness of the reform while also applauding the reformatory effort), 
with Walsh, supra note 13, at 4 (commenting on the breadth of the reform 
effort while highlighting concern of public employees in 2011).  See also 
MORRISSEY, supra note 22, at 1. 
 213.  Note that a public employee with less than ten years of service is not 
completely ruled out at this stage.  If she succeeds in establishing a 
contractual relationship with the State, she too can presumably establish a 
substantial impairment of that relationship.  See discussion supra Part 
III.A.i.  Modifications to pension systems that frustrate merely the 
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just impose one or two of the elements discussed, rather it imposes 
all three, plus a variety of additional modifications to the public 
retirement system that, for the sake of brevity, will not be 
discussed in this Comment.  While Rhode Island’s public pension 
system may have suffered through “a death by a thousand cuts,” 
the deepest and most significant of the cuts are a direct result of 
RIRSA.214  RIRSA is not a traditional legislative modification of a 
public pension system; it is a remarkably broad act that imposes a 
diverse array of burdens on public employees across the entire 
public-sector.  The aggregate burdens and impairments of RIRSA 
rise to the level of substantiality necessary for challengers to clear 
the heightened first prong of the Contract Clause analysis. 
B.   Can Rhode Island Show a Legitimate Public Purpose Behind 
RIRSA? 
Having addressed the predicate issue of whether RIRSA 
substantially impairs a public contract, the analysis turns to 
whether the government can articulate a legitimate purpose 
behind the legislation.  A state may impair a contract where it 
serves a legitimate governmental interest through necessary and 
appropriate means.215  It is important to note again that while 
this language mirrors in many respects the rational basis test 
employed by courts, it is clearly not the rational basis test.  
Neither, however, is it intermediate or strict scrutiny.  The 
appropriate test for a Contract Clause challenge involving a public 
contract employs a more searching inquiry than the deferential 
rational basis test, but does not reach the exacting inquiry of more 
 
expectation interest in non-vested benefits are generally insufficient for the 
purposes of establishing requisite substantiality of impairment for the 
purposes of the Contract Clause.  See, e.g., Nonnenmacher v. City of 
Warwick, 722 A.2d 1199, 1203 (R.I. 1999).  However, some courts have found 
that non-vested employees have contractual rights in pension plans, with 
those rights being subject to reasonable modification by the legislature.  See, 
e.g., Nev. Emps. Ass’n, Inc. v. Keating, 903 F.2d 1223, 1227 (9th Cir. 1990).  
The question of RIRSA’s reasonableness is certainly in question and is better 
suited at Prongs II and III of the Contract Clause analysis; thus, non-vested 
employees should be afforded the benefit of further judicial review. 
 214.  MORRISSEY, supra note 22, at 7.  
 215.  See, e.g., U.S. Trust Co. of N.Y. v. New Jersey, 431 U.S. 1, 22 (1977); 
Parella v. Ret. Bd. of R.I. Emps.’ Ret. Sys., 173 F.3d 46, 59 (1st Cir. 1999); 
R.I. Hospitality Ass ’n v. City of Providence, 775 F. Supp. 2d 416, 434 (D.R.I.  
2011); Nonnenmacher, 722 A.2d at 1202. 
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formal heightened scrutiny.  It appears that this is the case 
because Contract Clause jurisprudence, both in Rhode Island and 
nationally, is unfortunately far less developed than other areas of 
law dealing with heightened scrutiny.  To exceed rational basis 
while not reaching heightened scrutiny invites a simple solution: 
the judiciary should make an independent assessment of the 
reasonableness of the law.  This does not invoke the mere 
rationality of the law, but the reasonableness of its application to 
circumstances.  The purpose of this step of the Contract Clause 
evaluation is to establish the legitimate public purpose behind the 
legislation that will be evaluated with extra vigilance at Prong III 
of the analysis.216  As a normative matter, the government 
generally has no issue with establishing a legitimate public 
purpose.  As such, this Section will introduce some of the potential 
legislative purposes behind RIRSA identified in the “Legislative 
intent and findings” section of the law itself, but will operate 
under a presumption of legitimacy consistent with general, 
analytic themes in constitutional jurisprudence.217 
At the outset of RIRSA, the General Assembly expressed its 
primary intention “to ensure the sustainability of the state’s 
public retirement systems.”218  In support of this intent, the 
legislature reiterated the vulnerabilities of Rhode Island’s public 
pension system and the general economic hardships that the State 
faced at the time of the legislation.219  Additionally, they 
identified “Rhode Island’s critically underfunded pension system” 
as a factor that, when combined with the State’s general economic 
woes and preexisting tax burden to citizens, “threatens the base 
pensions of current and future public workers, hampers the ability 
of the state to provide its citizens with vital services necessary for 
the public’s health, safety and welfare, and places an 
unsustainable financial burden on all Rhode Island citizens and 
taxpayers.”220  In a similar vein, the legislature expressed concern 
that Rhode Island’s current pension system, if left as is, “will 
substantially increase Rhode Island’s capital cost structure and 
adversely affect and greatly diminish the state’s ability to address 
 
 216.  See, e.g., McGrath v. R.I. Ret. Bd., 88 F.3d 12, 16 (1st Cir. 1996). 
 217.  See 2011 R.I. Pub. Laws 408, § 1; 2011 R.I. Pub. Laws 409, § 1. 
 218.  2011 R.I. Pub. Laws 408, § 1(a); 2011 R.I. Pub. Laws  409, § 1(a).  
 219.  2011 R.I. Pub. Laws  409, § 1(a)(1)–(2).   
 220.  Id. §1(a)(3). 
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critical infrastructure needs for education, transportation, and 
other public projects.”221 
The General Assembly continued by “find[ing] and declar[ing] 
that it is of critical and immediate public importance that these 
public pension programs be restructured” for a variety of 
reasons.222  Among the legislature’s articulated reasons behind 
RIRSA are:  (1) “[t]o ensure that the state [and municipalities] will 
be able to provide retirement benefits that will enable our public 
employees to enjoy a dignified employment”;223 (2) “[t]o ensure a 
secure and adequate source of retirement funds for public retiree 
benefits”;224 and (3) “[t]o ensure that the cost of current and future 
benefits is not so great and onerous that it jeopardizes the ability 
and obligation of the state and [municipalities] to fund the costs of 
[education, sustainable economy, infrastructure, providing needs 
to vulnerable citizens, and] other essential programs and 
purposes.”225 
In the “Legislative intent and findings” section of RIRSA, the 
General Assembly concludes by expressly finding and declaring 
that the public pension crisis in Rhode Island “ha[d] reached an 
emergency stage and must be addressed without delay.”226  Thus, 
it appears that the General Assembly identified three broad public 
purposes behind RIRSA: (1) ensuring that the public pension 
system does not collapse due to the State’s inability to fund it; (2) 
a general concern that the State would not have been able to meet 
its obligations under its sovereign police power, such as providing 
adequate education and maintaining infrastructural integrity, 
absent public pension cuts and restructure; and (3) the overall 
economic status of the public pension system had reached an 
“emergency” level and therefore needed to be addressed.  Because 
the means of RIRSA are not reasonable and appropriate to 
achieving even a legitimate government interest, this Comment 
will assume that governmental purpose animating RIRSA is 
legitimate for the purpose of further analysis.227 
 
 221.  Id. §1(a)(11)–(12). 
 222.  Id. §1(b); id. §1(b)(1)–(4).  
 223.  Id. §1(b)(1). 
 224.  Id. §1(b)(2). 
 225.  Id. §1(b)(1)–(3). 
 226.  Id. §1(b)(4). 
 227.  For arguments challenging the legitimacy of the General Assembly’s 
purported public purposes behind RIRSA, see generally MORRISSEY, supra 
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C. Are the Contractual Impairments Reasonable and Necessary in 
Light of the Public Purposes Behind RIRSA? 
If the court finds a legitimate public purpose behind RIRSA, it 
will then determine if the contractual impairment established at 
Prong I is reasonable and necessary in light of the public purpose 
driving the legislation.228  The General Assembly borrowed 
language directly from Contract Clause jurisprudence, concluding 
the “Legislative intent and findings” section of RIRSA by declaring 
the legislation to be “reasonable and necessary to achieve and 
protect the compelling public interests listed [t]herein.”229  
 
note 22.  Morrissey argues, inter alia, that Rhode Island’s economic problems 
have little to do with public employees currently receiving retirement 
benefits, but rather are a result of decades of improper and ineffective 
spending by politicians in the State.  Id. at 1–2, 7–9.  Other commentators, 
including Morrissey, have argued that the actuarial numbers used by then 
General Treasurer Gina Raimondo in her campaign to drum up public 
support for RIRSA are unreliable.  See, e.g., id. at 4–9 (critiquing Gina 
Raimondo’s “Truth in Numbers” report as false and misleading).  
Additionally, a union-backed, financial, forensic investigation of Gina 
Riamondo’s handling of the state pension fund has accused Ms. Raimondo of 
using public pension reform as a Trojan horse to pull legislative wool over the 
public’s eyes and improperly invest public pension money in financially risky 
hedge funds with the intent of enriching herself and two venture capitalist 
partnerships she formerly managed at the venture capitalist firm, Point 
Judith Capital.  See Katherine Gregg, Forensic investigation’ financed by 
union blasts Raimondo’s handling of R.I. pension fund, PROVIDENCE J., (Oct. 
17, 2013, 1:00PM), http://www.providencejournal.com/breaking-news/content/ 
20131017-forensic-investigation-financed-by-union-blasts-raimondo-s-handlin 
g-of-r.i.-pension-fund.ece.  Absent a thorough investigation by the Securities 
and Exchanges Commission, this author is not prepared to expressly rely on 
this argument, but interested readers should see generally Edward “Ted” 
Siedle, Rhode Island Public Pension Reform: Wall Street’s License to Steal, 
FORBES INC. (Oct. 18, 2013, 8:26 AM), http://www.forbes.com/ 
sites/edwardsiedle/2013/10/18/rhode-island-public-pension-reform-wall-street 
s-license-to-steal/.  See also R.I. GEN. LAWS § 36-8-17 (2011) (“[N]o member of 
the board . . . shall have any interest, direct or indirect, in the gains or profits 
of any investment made by the retirement board.”); 2011 R.I. Pub. Laws 408, 
§ 4, repealing R.I. GEN. LAWS § 36-8-8.1 (Supp. 2014) (directing the retirement 
board to conduct an internal audit on all special pension benefits conferred).  
If Governor Raimondo is conclusively found by an independent investigation 
to have used RIRSA to enrich herself directly or indirectly through her 
previous employer, Point Judith Capital, a reasonable argument can be made 
that the articulated public purposes of RIRSA are not “legitimate.” 
 228.  See, e.g., U.S. Trust Co. of N.Y. v. New Jersey, 431 U.S. 1, 22, 25 
(1977); Nonnenmacher v. City of Warwick, 722 A.2d 1199, 1203 (R.I. 1999).  
 229.  2011 R.I. Pub. Laws 408, § 1(b)(4). 
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Further, the General Assembly applied their own balancing test 
and declared that “the achievement of [the aforementioned] 
compelling state interests . . . far outweigh[s] any impact that 
[RIRSA] might have upon the expectations of active and retired 
members of the affected pension systems as to future pensions.”230  
Despite the General Assembly’s self-affirmation that it was 
justified in repudiating and changing the material terms of its 
contractual relationship with public employees, it is the role of the 
judiciary to engage in this evaluative analysis, not the legislature. 
Challenges that allege legislative impairment of public 
contracts to which the state is a party are evaluated with extra 
vigilance because the state’s self-interest is at stake, rendering 
rational basis deference to the legislature inappropriate.231  In the 
case of RIRSA, the reviewing court will likely be wary of the fact 
that the State obviously has a self-interest in avoiding their 
financial obligations to public employees, and accordingly, it will 
likely review the government’s justifications with a higher degree 
of scrutiny then it would if the government had impaired a 
contract between two private entities through legislation.232  
While not rising to the level of strict scrutiny, the court applies a 
variable degree of scrutiny that is clearly more searching than the 
rational basis standard.233 
Additionally, a court must consider the “substantiality” of the 
contractual impairment established earlier in the Contract Clause 
analysis to better frame the analytic inquiry of whether the 
impairment was “reasonable and necessary” in light of the State’s 
articulated public purpose behind the legislation.234  Accordingly, 
the more substantial the impairment, the more difficult it will be 
to conclude that the impairment is reasonable and necessary.235  
 
 230.  Id. 
 231.  See, e.g., U.S. Trust Co. of N.Y., 431 U.S. at 25–26; McGrath v. R.I. 
Ret. Bd., 88 F.3d 12, 16 (1st Cir. 1996). 
 232.  See, e.g., U.S. Trust Co. of N.Y., 431 U.S. at 25–26; McGrath, 88 F.3d 
at 16.  As stated above in note 9, this case, at the time of this writing, 
appears to be on the cusp of settlement.  A settlement is by no means 
determinative on the issue of RIRSA ’s constitutionality.  Accordingly, the 
following argument still has constitutional merit and is styled in as if the 
litigation were to continue without settlement.  
 233.  See discussion supra Part II.C. 
 234.  See, e.g., Energy Reserves Grp., Inc. v. Kan. Power & Light Co., 459 
U.S. 400, 411–12 (1983). 
 235.  See, e.g., id.  
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Given that the impairments of the contract in question, as 
discussed in Section I above, are dire, the means used by RIRSA 
must be reasonable in light of their severity. 
RIRSA’s means are not reasonable, nor are they necessary.  
They radically alter the relationship between the parties without 
regard to the effects on retirees and public employees.  The 
calculus of RIRSA disregards the State’s contractual obligations in 
order to secure its bottom-line fiscal budget.  While it may be 
difficult to balance the State’s budget, the State cannot do so by 
trampling the rights of its employees by discharging its 
obligations through legislative fiat.  The Contract Clause, if it is to 
have any meaning at all, must prohibit this action.  It is essential 
to a system of ordered liberty that governments be constrained by 
the organic documents that give them form and authority.  The 
State of Rhode Island must be so constrained from using drastic 
means to achieve its objective of solvency.  It must act only in 
accordance with the dictates of its Constitution.  It must follow the 
principle of its Contracts Clause.236 
i.  Are the Contractual Impairments Reasonable in Light of the 
Public Purposes Behind RIRSA? 
Government reform in the abstract is generally accepted as 
beneficial for society.  There is a presumption that the legislature 
will not act unreasonably.  Therefore the judiciary will often defer 
to the judgment of the elected officials to do what is in the best 
interest of society.  The issue of public pension reform falls into a 
controversial area of legislative utilitarianism, where the 
expectation is that the smaller group of public employees will 
make an economic sacrifice for the greater good.  Indeed, all states 
allow for reasonable modification of public pensions to 
accommodate changing conditions and to keep the public pension 
itself flexible.237  However, at this stage of the Contract Clause 
analysis, it is incumbent on the court to protect the public from 
overreaching and abusive legislation such as RIRSA. 
What constitutes a “reasonable” modification of public 
 
 236.  To reiterate, for the purposes of this Section, the articulated policy 
goals of RIRSA, discussed above at Part. III.B, are presumed to be valid.  
 237.  See Mumford & Leto Pareja, supra note 27, at 40–41; see also 
MONAHAN, supra note 17, at 6.   
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employee retirement benefits is not entirely clear.238  Generally 
speaking, the reasonable modification rule states “[t]o be 
sustained as reasonable, alterations of employees’ pension rights 
must bear some material relation to the theory of a pension 
system and its successful operation, and changes in a pension plan 
which result in disadvantage to employees should be accompanied 
by comparable new advantages.”239  This premise can be broken 
up into two elements: (1) whether RIRSA alters pension rights in 
a way that relates to the theory of a successful public pension 
system; and (2) whether RIRSA appropriately disperses the 
benefits of the legislation with the detriments to the infringed 
upon public employees. 
Despite the stated concern in the “Legislative intent and 
findings” section of RIRSA regarding the State’s inability to 
provide secure pension benefits in the future without modification 
to employees current contributory obligations, there is no 
definitive evidence that RIRSA’s massive overhaul of the public 
employee retirement system will achieve success.240  In fact, one 
commentator has concluded that elements of RIRSA “actually  
increase[] costs to the state and local governments and taxpayers 
while making retirement incomes less secure and failing to make 
up for the cuts to the [defined benefit] portion of employees’ 
pensions.”241  While there may be significant debate regarding the 
success of defined benefit plans versus defined contribution plans, 
it is likely that the increased retirement age and seized COLA 
benefits will, on a purely numerical level, undoubtedly contribute 
to refunding the pension system.  In spite of this, a more 
completely funded public pension is not necessarily successful if it 
is attained through measures that run contrary to the policy 
theories that underpin a contemporary understanding of public 
pension benefits.242 
 
 238.  See Mumford & Leto Pareja, supra note 27, at 40–41. 
 239.  Allen v. City of Long Beach, 287 P.2d 765, 767 (Cal. 1955). 
 240.  See 2011 R.I. Pub. Laws 1919–21. 
 241.  HILTONSMITH supra note 21, at 5 (relying on actuarial evaluation of 
the Employee’s Retirement System of Rhode Island from June, 30, 2010 to 
predict the inefficiency of defined contribution plans).   
 242.  See generally WILLIAM C. GREENOUGH & FRANCIS P. KING, PENSION 
PLANS AND PUBLIC POLICY 121–34, 176–209, 210–41 (1976) (referencing 
specifically Chapter 5 entitled “Public Employee Retirement Plans,” Chapter 
8 entitled “Public Policy—Financing Pension Benefits,” and Chapter 9 
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Even if a court finds the elements of RIRSA to be reasonably 
related to a theory of successful pension operations, the ends do 
not justify the means if the detriment imposed on the public 
employees is not accounted for by a countervailing benefit to the 
burdened class.243  States have adopted two distinct theories on 
how to measure a benefit and its corresponding detriment in 
evaluating the reasonableness of a public pension modification.244  
The first test considers each individual’s benefit incurred versus 
the detriment involved, and the second compares the benefits and 
detriments of the group as a whole.245 
Under the first test, the court requires the benefits and 
detriments of each individual to be evaluated.246  Under this 
framework, “if one employee experiences a detriment from the 
[modification to the pension system], that same employee also 
must experience an offsetting benefit” in order for the modification 
to be sustained as reasonable.247  The most obvious case of RIRSA 
falling outside of this framework is the retirees who “temporarily” 
forfeit their COLAs.  It is immaterial if future public employees 
enjoy the benefits of a sustainable public pension system as a 
result of the detriment placed on retirees, because the burdened 
retiree receives no countervailing benefit.248  “The benefits 
experienced by other employees cannot offset the detriment of the 
individual employee.”249  The system cannot be reasonable under 
the circumstances of its enactment if it accrues all of its benefits to 
the state at the zero-sum expense of harm to current employees 
and retirees. 
Under the second theory of “benefit versus detriment,” the 
court will evaluate the benefits and detriments of the public 
 
entitled “Public Policy—Income Objectives and Retirement Ages”). 
 243.  See Allen, 287 P.2d at 767–68. 
 244.  See Mumford & Leto Pareja, supra note 27, at 41. 
 245.  See id.  
 246.  See, e.g., Abbott v. City of L.A., 326 P.2d 484, 489–92 (Cal. 1958) 
(exploring the benefits and detriments that the city’s pension modification 
had on the plaintiff). 
 247.  Mumford & Leto Pareja, supra note 27, at 41. 
 248.  See id.  This argument also logically applies to all current members 
of the retirement system as well because they will receive no true benefit 
from the detriment of having their COLA permanently reduced.  An 
argument also can be made for older current public employees in regards to 
the increase in retirement age. 
 249.  Id. (citing Abbot, 326 P.2d at 484). 
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employees as a whole.250  “[I]f the overall benefit to the employees 
as a group offsets the overall detriment to the employees as a 
whole, then the change is valid as a reasonable modification.”251  
This utilitarian balancing act forces the court to evaluate the 
overall economic policies of the government as opposed to the more 
tangible interests of individual parties.  It will be exceedingly 
difficult for a judge or jury to weigh an elderly retiree’s loss of 
COLA benefits for two-and-a-half decades against the 
unpredictable benefits to the group of employees as a result of the 
reform effort.  The court should reject the “group as a whole” test 
and instead evaluate the detriments and benefits of the 
modifications as they apply to individual classes of employees.  
Even if a court does not, the important consideration is the 
allocation of benefits and harms.  As a whole group, employees are 
universally harmed.  They receive no benefit whatsoever.  They 
receive no concession, and the state makes no effort to 
accommodate them.  They worked, in many cases for decades, 
upon the promise of a pension at a value set by the General 
Assembly.  They retired to find that the General Assembly felt it 
appropriate to deny them all the benefits they expected and keep 
all savings to itself.  This cannot, as a matter of law, constitute a 
reasonable modification of a government contract.  The severity of 
RIRSA is its undoing.  There is simply no reasonableness in the 
law.   
 Further, the court may follow the precedent set in United 
States Trust Co. of New York and place an emphasis on the 
foreseeability of the impairment in determining the 
reasonableness of the legislation.252  There, the state governments 
of New York and New Jersey retroactively repealed a 1962 
statutory covenant that provided financial security to holders of 
bond issued by the Port Authorities of New York and New 
Jersey.253  The states argued that retroactive repeal of the 
 
 250.  See id. 
 251.  Id. (citing Singer v. City of Topeka, 607 P.2d 467 (Kan. 1980)). 
 252.  431 U.S. 1, 31–32 (1977).  See also id. at 32 (Burger, C.J., concurring) 
(explaining that “the State must show that it did not know and could not 
have known the impact of the contract on that state interest at the time that 
the contract was made” to properly repeal the covenant); Clarke, supra note 
85, at 197 (explaining the Court ’s “unreasonableness” test in terms of 
foreseeability). 
 253.  U.S. Trust Co. of N.Y., 431 U.S. at 4–14 (detailing the history leading 
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covenant was reasonable for the purposes of a Contract Clause 
challenge because it occurred as a result of changed 
circumstances, namely a shift in the public perception in favor of 
public transportation.254  Justice Blackmun, writing for the 
majority, keyed in on the government’s ability to foresee and 
anticipate this shift in public perception between the time the 
covenant was adopted in 1962 and when it was unilaterally 
repealed by the state governments in 1974.255  Blackmun 
concluded that a societal need for public transit had been well 
documented and ongoing since 1922, and therefore, the 
government should have reasonably expected this ongoing 
development.256  He concluded by acknowledging that while the 
government could not have foreseen the degree of public concern 
for environmental protection and energy conservation that would 
exist in 1974, twelve years before the covenant was drafted, these 
concerns were, nevertheless, not totally unknown to the 
legislature at the time of contracting.257  Therefore, the changed 
circumstances were inadequate for the purposes of justifying a 
contractual repeal as “reasonable.”258  Chief Justice Burger 
underscored this evaluative framework of reasonableness in cases 
of government interference with public contract by emphasizing, 
in his concurrence, that “the State must show that it did not and 
could not have known the impact of the contract on [the State’s 
articulated interest at Prong II of a Contract Clause challenge] at 
the time that the contract was made.”259 
Adopting this framework of foreseeability in order to 
determine reasonableness, RIRSA’s contractual impairments are 
unreasonable.  It should be noted that the requisite course for the 
State has always been to simply fund its pension program 
adequately.  Regardless of whatever economic harms occurred to 
the State, the appropriate stance has always been for the State to 
ensure adequate funding.  It has not done so.  It is not reasonable 
to apportion the harm of that failure to those who had no say in 
 
up to the repeal of the 1962 covenant). 
 254.  Id. at 29, 32. 
 255.  Id. at 31–32. 
 256.  Id. 
 257.  Id. 
 258.  Id. at 32.  
 259.  Id. (Burger, C.J., concurring). 
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the degree of funding apportioned to the pension system.  It is 
foreseeable that pension costs will exist, and they must be met.  
The State cannot dodge its obligations by asserting a myopia 
about fundamental realities. 
In sum, in light of the legislature’s articulated public purposes 
behind RIRSA, its modifications are largely unreasonable.  
RIRSA, in effect, runs contrary to major theories that underpin a 
successful public pension system.  An evaluation of the individual 
benefits and detriments to public employees reveals a severely 
unequitable distribution, particularly to certain individual 
members of the retirement system who are retired.  Moreover, 
even if the assessment of benefits and detriments is taken from a 
purely utilitarian, “greater good” perspective, the future benefits 
of RIRSA are speculative in nature, and they do not outweigh the 
gross burdens suffered by public employees at large.  Additionally, 
the government could have reasonably foreseen the economic 
issues that could flow from underfunded public pension liabilities 
at the time it entered into a contract with the employees.  The fact 
that circumstances changed in the form of the national recession 
in the late 2000s to early 2010 is not sufficient to make the 
unilateral modification of the entire public pension system 
“reasonable” for the purposes of a Contract Clause analysis.  
Given the heightened degree of judicial scrutiny at this prong of 
the analysis, a court would likely conclude that RIRSA’s 
impairments are unreasonable in light of any of the legislature’s 
previously stated public purposes. 
ii.  Are Contractual Impairments Necessary in Light of the Public 
Purposes behind RIRSA? 
Even if a court were to find the contractual impairments 
imposed by RIRSA to be reasonable in light of the government’s 
public purpose, the court would still be required to evaluate if the 
impairments were necessary to achieve that purpose.260  
Questions of necessity in this sphere can be considered on two 
levels: (1) whether the legislative impairment as presented is 
essential in order to achieve the public purpose behind the 
 
 260.  See, e.g., id. at 28–29 (majority opinion); Nat’l Educ. Ass’n-Rhode 
Island ex rel. Scigulinsky v. Ret. Bd. of the R.I. Emps. Ret. Sys., 890 F. Supp. 
1143, 1162–64 (D.R.I. 1995). 
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legislation; and (2) whether less burdensome alternative means 
were available to achieve similar policy goals.261  Under this 
analytic framework, RIRSA and all the impairments that it 
prescribed were not necessary to achieve the legislature’s goals of 
maintaining a sustainable public pension fund in the future and 
ensuring that the State has the economic resources available to 
meet its obligations to the general citizenry under its police 
power.262 
The first inquiry in determining the necessity of the 
legislation in the face of impairment requires the court to evaluate 
if the impairment is essential in order to achieve the public 
purpose behind the legislation.263  In order for RIRSA to be 
“essential,” the court must determine that the government could 
not have achieved its purported policy ends without the 
modifications imposed by RIRSA.264  In doing so, the court is to 
consider if less drastic contractual modifications could have been 
employed to achieve the RIRSA’s desired effect.265 
Through this lens, RIRSA is not essential to achieve the 
stated policy goals of protecting the pension system from collapse 
due to underfunding.  As already discussed, it is well settled that 
a legislature may make reasonable changes to public pension 
systems to accommodate legislative flexibility and account for 
changing circumstances.  By contrast, RIRSA represents an 
unprecedented and overly ambitious model for public pension 
reform in both scope and degree.  Even if deemed reasonable, 
RIRSA cannot be seen as essential for the purposes of establishing 
“necessity.” 
Public pension reform can take many shapes to achieve the 
self-preservationist policy goals intended to maintain the solvency 
of a public pension system.  Stuart Buck, in his 2012 article The 
Legal Ramifications of Public Pension Reform, identifies seven 
individual modifications to public pension plans that could 
presumably achieve the goals of more sustainably maintaining the 
 
 261.  See, e.g., U.S. Trust Co. of N.Y., 431 U.S. at 29–30.   
 262.  See discussion of legitimate public purposes behind RIRSA above in 
Part III.B. 
 263.  See U.S. Trust Co. of N.Y., 431 U.S. at 29–30. 
 264.  See id. at 30. 
 265.  See id. 
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economic feasibility of the public pension system.266  The General 
Assembly did not choose to implement one individual reformatory 
modification of the public pension system, but rather it 
implemented an amalgamation of nearly all of pension reform 
tactics discussed by Buck.267  RIRSA could be whittled down to a 
reasonable public pension reform structure and, very likely, 
substantially achieve the policy goal of maintaining a workable 
and solvent public pension system.268  Similarly, the harshness of 
the modifications in RIRSA could be significantly reduced and still 
presumably lead to a more financially stable and digestible public 
pension reform structure.269  Therefore, it is difficult to conclude 
that the scope and degree of contractual impairments imposed by 
RIRSA’s various pension reform elements, as it stands, were 
essential to achieve any legitimate policy goal of the legislature. 
At this stage of the Contract Clause analysis, the court will 
also consider any “less restrictive alternatives” to RIRSA.270  In so 
doing, the court will consider the availability of alternative means 
that could have achieved the legislature’s purported policy ends 
without impairing the government’s financial obligations to its 
 
 266.  Buck, supra note 6, at 67–88 (discussing: (a) Contribution Increases, 
(b) COLA Reductions, (c) Changing the Multiplier, (d) Changing What 
Components of Compensation Are Included, (e) Changing the Averaging 
Period, (f) Changing the Retirement Age, and (g) Converting to a Different 
Pension System Entirely).  Buck’s central focus seems to be on the logical 
concept of “pro-rating” employment benefits for the purposes of avoiding 
arbitrary and unfair reform practices.  See id. at 69–70.  While he applauds 
some of the more mathematically creative reformatory elements of RIRSA as 
being consistent with this pro-rating principle, he ultimately assesses each 
individual reform in its own insular universe and fails to realistically 
consider RIRSA as a whole, as that legislation implements nearly all of his 
suggested reforms in some capacity at once rather than as separate reforms.  
See id. at 74–80. 
 267.  See id. at 67–88.   
 268.  Note that the individual categories of pension reform discussed by 
Buck might carry their own constitutional implications.  See id. at 67–88; see 
also U.S. Trust Co. of N.Y., 431 U.S. at 30 n.28 (declining to evaluate whether 
any lesser impairments acknowledged by the Court would be constitutional). 
 269.  Namely, the suspension of COLA benefits to retirees appears outside 
of the regulatory modifications recommended by Buck, who appears to be a 
strong proponent of legislative reform of public pensions.  Buck, supra note 6, 
at 71–74 (recommending a pro-rata approach to COLA reductions and 
neglecting to speak to RIRSA’s retiree COLA seizure). 
 270.  See U.S Trust Co. of N.Y., 431 U.S. at 30–31.   
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public employees.271  Certainly, alternatives to RIRSA exist for 
the purposes of maintaining a financially solvent pension system 
that are both evident and more moderate than the unprecedented 
restructure of employee benefits prescribed by that statute. 
The government maintains substantial financial autonomy to 
divert any number of revenues into the public pension system for 
the purposes of protecting that system and providing a dignified 
retirement for future retirees.272  For example, under its taxing 
power, the government maintains the ability to fully fund the 
pension system through public tax increases.273  While such an 
alternative may be politically toxic, it remains a viable option to 
defaulting on financial obligations aimed at a particularized class 
of employees.  In a similar vein, the government is free to cut costs 
to programs that it owes no obligation to under contract.  Again, 
while this is not an ideal task, the government acknowledged that 
meeting this compelling interest would not be easy.274  If the 
government is compelled to engage in pension reform to seemingly 
save the public employees from themselves, it must be prepared to 
use any and all available means to reach that end.  In this case, 
the government chose a path to financial stability that plainly 
impaired its financial obligations to an individualized group of 
employees.  As this flies in the face of the Contract Clause of the 
United States and Rhode Island constitutions, the legislature 
rightly must make an alternative, a likely equally difficult choice, 
about how to restore economic stability to the pension system in 
Rhode Island. 
Because RIRSA was not essential to the articulated policy 
goals of the legislature, and because less restrictive alternative 
means to these policy ends are apparent, RIRSA is not legally 
necessary to achieve any legitimate public purpose.  More 
moderate courses of action exist in both the realm of reasonable 
and controlled public pension reform, as well as in the realm of 
 
 271.  See id. at 31. 
 272.  2011 R.I  Pub. Laws 1921. 
 273.  See R.I. CONST. art. VI, §§ 12, 17; id. art. XIII, §§ 4–5.  While the 
Rhode Island Constitution does not expressly deal with the General 
Assembly’s taxing power, these articles, read together, reference that power 
by implication. 
 274.  See GINA RAIMONDO, TRUTH IN NUMBERS: THE SECURITY & 
SUSTAINABILITY OF RHODE ISLAND’S RETIREMENT SYSTEM 2 (2011), available at 
http://www.law.yale.edu/documents/pdf/cbl/RI_TIN-WEB-06-1-11.pdf. 
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economic state reform on an abstract and general level.  The mere 
fact that the State chose to target public pensions as the avenue 
for economic stability does not thereby render RIRSA reasonable 
nor necessary.  In spite of the legislature’s self-affirming balancing 
tests of RIRSA, the scales of justice tilt in favor of the 
unconstitutionality of RIRSA. 
iii. Are the Contractual Impairments imposed by RIRSA 
Reasonable and Necessary when Viewed Through the Prism of an 
Economic “Emergency?” 
Perhaps anticipating RIRSA to be insufficiently reasonable 
and necessary to pass constitutional muster, the General 
Assembly augmented its “Legislative intent and findings” with the 
caveat that “the situation currently confronting the State of Rhode 
Island’s publically financed pension systems [to have] reached an 
emergency stage.”275  The legitimate existence of an emergency is 
one of many indicia considered by courts in the evaluation of the 
reasonableness and necessity of legislative impairments of 
contract.276  A court should remain skeptical to the objectivity of 
an emergency declaration, given the innate prejudice imbedded 
within legislative impairments of public contracts to which the 
State is a party.277  Accordingly, a court should critically evaluate 
the severity, foreseeability, and general reasonableness of such an 
emergency declaration and juxtapose it against the relative degree 
and nature of the impairment imposed by the legislation in order 
to effectively evaluate the weight of such a claim at this stage of 
the Contract Clause analysis. 
The most familiar example of the interplay between 
emergencies and the legislative impairment of contract is Home 
 
 275.  2011 R.I. Pub. Laws 1921 (emphasis added).  This express finding 
and declaration of an apparent financial emergency by the General Assembly 
is of notable significance at the third prong of the Contract Clause analysis 
and, therefore, will be addressed separately below. 
 276.  See, e.g., Home Bldg. & Loan Ass ’n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398, 420–23 
(1934); Cycle Barn, Inc. v. Arctic Cat Sales Inc., 701 F. Supp. 2d 1197, 1203 
(W.D. Wash. 2010) (citing Chico’s Pizza Franchises v. Sisemore, 544 F. Supp. 
248, 249 (E.D. Wash 1981)). 
 277.  See, e.g., U.S. Trust Co. of N.Y. v. New Jersey, 431 U.S. 1, 25–26 
(1977); Md. State Teachers Ass ’n, Inc. v. Hughes, 594 F. Supp. 1353, 1360 (D. 
Md. 1984). 
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Building & Loan Association v. Blaisdell.278  There, the Supreme 
Court of the United States considered a private Contract Clause 
challenge to a Minnesota mortgage law that was passed in the 
wake of the Great Depression.279  The law, among other things, 
extended the period of redemption on foreclosed properties and 
was to remain in effect “only during the continuance of the 
emergency and in no event beyond May 1, 1935.”280  A creditor 
alleged that the law impaired his contractual relationship with a 
borrower and, therefore, was repugnant to the federal Contract 
Clause.281  Finding a contractual impairment and accepting the 
state court’s finding that the legislature did not have any bias in 
declaring an emergency, the Court considered state emergency 
powers generally and the material elements of the statute to 
determine if the impairment was nevertheless reasonable in light 
of those circumstances.282  The Court ultimately upheld the 
Minnesota law after it concluded that the statutory impairment of 
the contract was narrowly tailored in such a way that it was 
reasonable in light of the valid emergency.283 
Some commentators have suggested that the factual parallels 
between Rhode Island’s pension crisis and the Great Depression 
may render the evaluative line of reasoning in Blaisdell applicable 
in this case.284  This conclusion is misguided for two primary 
reasons: (1) it necessarily relies on the premise that the national 
recession, (a) unpredictably precipitated the dire economic 
circumstances in Rhode Island leading to its allegedly 
unsustainable pension public pension system and (b) the recession 
and its impact on Rhode Island is, therefore, on a commensurate 
tier of economic emergency as the Great Depression; and (2) it 
overlooks the settled differences of appropriate judicial scrutiny 
between cases of private contractual impairments and public 
contractual impairments to which the State is a party.285  
 
 278.  290 U.S. 398. 
 279.  Id. at 415–16, 419. 
 280.  Id. at 417 (emphasis added) (internal quotation marks omitted); see 
also Chung, supra note 5, at 707. 
 281.  Blaisdell, 290 U.S. at 415–16. 
 282.  Id. at 419–27. 
 283.  Id. at 444–48. 
 284.  See, e.g., Buck, supra note 6, at 27, 81, 88–91; Chung, supra note 5, 
at 710–12. 
 285.  See Blaisdell, 290 U.S. at 415–16.  Blaisdell dealt with a statutory 
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Blaisdell does not control because Rhode Island is the victim of 
self-inflected economic negligence rather than the unforeseen and 
dramatic consequences of the Great Depression.  Additionally, the 
Rhode Island pension issue involves a dramatic legislative breach 
of financial contractual obligation, as opposed to a narrow and 
temporary breach of private contract. 
As a matter of common sense, every state is aware of the 
financial and economic implications of a publically funded pension 
system.  Rhode Island chose to neglect its obligations to this fund 
and set itself up for disaster. A state’s economic mismanagement 
does not give rise to a financial emergency.  Unlike the Great 
Depression, which led to a “nation wide [sic] and world wide [sic] 
business and financial crisis [that had] the same results as if it 
were caused by flood, earthquake, or disturbance in nature,” the 
pension crisis in Rhode Island was more the result of decades of 
economic mismanagement than a singular national economic 
catastrophe.286  The economic recession of the late 2000s was 
precipitated in part by the burst of the housing bubble and the 
collapse of the sub-prime mortgage crises.287  Nationally, the 
states suffered, but few as badly as Rhode Island.  This does not 
necessitate the conclusion that Rhode Island’s pension system is 
allegedly unsustainable because of a national economic event.  
This overlooks the reasonable conclusion that the State’s public 
pension system was mismanaged, underfunded, and inherently 
flawed for decades.  A national economic event simply brought 
these flaws into focus.  While this conclusion may justify 
reasonable reform, it does not give rise to the government 
justifying RIRSA on the grounds of an unprecedented emergency 
stemming from pension underfunding. 
Even if one were to accept that the Rhode Island pension 
crisis was an “emergency,” that is still merely one factor to be 
considered in the “reasonable and necessary” analysis discussed in 
the preceding sections.  Applying the requisite level of scrutiny 
 
impairment of a contractual relationship between a mortgagee-buyer and a 
borrower, whereas the challenge to RIRSA involves a case of governmental 
self-interest and, thus, heightened scrutiny of the reasonableness of the 
impairment.  See id. 
 286.  Id. at 423 (quoting Blaisdell v. Home Bldg. & Loan Ass ’n, 249 N.W. 
334, 340 (1933) (Olsen, J., concurring)).  
 287.  See Chung, supra note 5, at 711. 
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prescribed for this stage of a Contract Clause challenge to a public 
contract, RIRSA is still both unreasonable and unnecessary.  In 
the event that the judiciary acknowledges the existence of an 
emergency, the government might be able to establish that the 
public pension reform was “necessary” to establish economic 
stability.  However, the broad scope and ambiguous obligations of 
RIRSA still render it unreasonable.  Specifically, there is a clear 
contrast between the narrow statute discussed in Blaisdell and 
RIRSA.288  Unlike Blaisdell, where the court relied on the 
narrowly tailored, temporary, and conditional private contractual 
impairment in conjuncture with an unprecedented economic 
emergency in concluding that the impairment was reasonable, 
RIRSA has permanent reductions and “suspensions” of benefits for 
indeterminate periods of time.289  Moreover, RIRSA deals with 
public contracts; thus, the court must more intently scrutinize the 
government’s position at this prong than did the Supreme Court 
in its evaluation of the statute in Blaisdell.290 
In conclusion, it is appropriate to review the “emergency” 
declared by the General Assembly in RIRSA with a fair degree of 
skepticism given its clear self-interest in avoiding its financial 
obligations to public employees.291  A critical look at this 
emergency reveals that the public pension crisis does not rise to 
the requisite level of “emergency” necessary to serve as a 
justification for RIRSA.  The economic issues facing Rhode Island 
are more likely the result of decades of public pension 
mismanagement rather than some unforeseen and dramatic 
economic catastrophe.  Even accepting the proposition that there 
is an economic emergency in Rhode Island, RIRSA still fails to 
pass the heightened hurdle of being a reasonable and necessary 
means to a legitimate policy end.  RIRSA is entirely too broad and 
indeterminate to be considered reasonable, even with the added 
weight of a legitimate emergency.  While reform might be 
necessary in the event that the public pension issue in Rhode 
Island has, in fact, crossed the threshold of an “emergency,” 
RIRSA cannot be perceived as a reasonable modification.  As the 
 
 288.  See 290 U.S. at 415–17, 443–46. 
 289.  See id. at 443–46. 
 290.  See id. at 415–16. 
 291.  See U.S. Trust Co. of N.Y. v. New Jersey, 431 U.S. 1, 25–26 (1977).   
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contractual impairment must be both necessary and reasonable to 
clear this hurdle, RIRSA remains unconstitutional when viewed 
through the lens of an alleged “emergency.” 
IV. CONCLUSION 
“Whether it be in the field of sports or the halls of the 
legislature it is not consonant with the American Tradition of 
fairness and justice to change the ground rules in the middle of 
the game.”292  It is incumbent upon the judiciary to ensure that 
American traditions of fairness, equity, and obligation are upheld 
when state legislatures attempt to exclude themselves from such 
foundational principals.  The Contract Clause is the judicial check 
on such legislative overreaching and abuse. 
RIRSA contains multiple reformatory elements that are 
repugnant to the Contract Clause of both the United States and 
Rhode Island constitutions, and therefore, the law should be 
declared unconstitutional and invalid.  The public employees have 
a contractual relationship with their employer—the State of 
Rhode Island—and thus, are entitled to the benefit of their 
bargain and fruits of their performance of a unilateral contract.  It 
is assumed that the State has a legitimate public purpose 
compelling public pension reform; however, elements of RIRSA 
substantially impair a contractual relationship with the public 
employees of the State in a way that is not reasonable and 
necessary in light of the State’s purported public purpose behind 
reform. 
This is not to say that any type of public pension reform is 
unreasonable, unnecessary, or otherwise unconstitutional.  States 
have, and ought to have, the legislative flexibility to make 
reasonable modifications to their public pension systems to 
account for changing circumstances.  RIRSA, however, is not a 
reasonable modification of Rhode Island’s ailing public pension 
system.  RIRSA is a profoundly ambitious attempt to rectify 
Rhode Island’s pension difficulties by placing all the costs of a 
solution upon those least able to bear them.  The Contract Clause 
should not serve as a safety blanket, protecting against any law 
that might impair previous contractual relationships with the 
 
 292.  Secunda, supra note 31, at 263 (quoting Sylvestre v. Minnesota, 214 
N.W.2d 658, 665 (Minn. 1973)).  
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State.  But if the clause is to have any meaning all, it must mean 
that the State cannot simply wave its hands and absolve itself of 
contracted obligations. The problem is especially more pressing 
given the origin of the pension crisis—it is the government of 
Rhode Island that created the underfunded pension liabilities that 
threaten the State, not the retirees.  The Contract Clause must 
protect existing public employment retirement benefits from the 
massive erosion that RIRSA authorizes. 
Although I conclude that RIRSA is unconstitutional, the 
public should, as I do, admire and applaud the General Assembly 
of Rhode Island and Governor Raimondo for being 
uncharacteristically proactive about the economic issues in Rhode 
Island.  Unfortunately, the government attempted economic 
reform in a way that wrote its own significant contractual 
obligations out of the law and, therefore, in violation of the settled 
(albeit murky) principles of Contract Clause jurisprudence.  This 
is not a case of the Rhode Island Constitution disallowing a broad 
range of government action.  Instead, this is only a check on the 
government’s power to abuse its plenary legislative authority to 
free itself of responsibility for promises given. 
Rhode Island and other states looking to sustainably reform 
public pension systems should consider limiting reform to 
reasonable and incremental steps that apply only to incoming 
workers.  This gives the worker the benefit of weighing the 
economic risks and benefits of the public-sector before commencing 
performance of a unilateral contract.  While this does not achieve 
the immediate economic result that Rhode Island sought, it 
maintains the integrity of contractual obligation in a rational and 
constitutional manner that will eventually achieve the desired 
result. 
The government should not be permitted to write its own 
substantial financial obligations out of the law.  Obligation and 
expectation are baseline principles of fairness that serve as pillars 
for organized society. As Friedrich Nietzsche wrote: 
. . . To ordain the future in advance . . . man must first 
have learned to distinguish necessary events from chance 
ones, to think causally, to see and anticipate distant 
eventualities as if they belonged to the present, to decide 
with certainty what is the goal and what the means to it, 
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and in general be able to calculate and compute. Man 
himself must first of all have become calculable, regular, 
necessary, even in his own image of himself, if he is to be 
able to stand security for his own future, which is what 
one who promises does! 
This precisely is the long story of how responsibility 
originated. The task of breeding an animal with the right 
to make promises evidently embraces and presupposes as 
a preparatory task that one first makes men to a certain 
degree necessary, uniform, like among like, regular, and 
consequently calculable.293 
If the government acts in a manner inconsistent with this 
bedrock concept, it is incumbent on the judiciary to ensure that 
the obligation and sanctity of contract law remain intact. 
 
 
 293.  FRIEDRICH NIETZSCHE, GENEALOGY OF MORALS 58–59 (Walter 
Kauffman ed. 1989), available at https://www.princeton.edu/~ereading/ 
Friedrich%20Nietzsche,%20Second%20EssayGuilt%20Bad%20Conscience%2
0and%20the%20Like.pdf.  Credit to Roy Kreitner for brining my attention to 
this quote in his book Calculating Promises: The Emergence of Modern 
American.  ROY KREITNER, CALCULATING PROMISES: THE EMERGENCE OF 
MODERN AMERICAN CONTRACT DOCTRINE  (1974).  
